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THE LUXEMBOURG EFFECT: PATENT BOXES AND THE LIMITS OF
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
Lilian V. Faulhaber *
This article uses patent boxes, which reduce taxes on income from patents
and other IP assets, to illustrate the fact that the jurisprudence of the
European Court of Justice has a longer reach than has previously been
recognized. This article argues that, along with having effects within the
European Union, the ECJ’s decisions can also have effects on countries
outside of the EU. In the direct tax context, the ECJ’s jurisprudence has
hampered the ability of both EU and non-EU countries to police international
tax avoidance.
In 2015, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) proposed restrictions on patent boxes that were designed to limit
income-shifting opportunities. As this article points out, these restrictions are
weaker than they could have been due to EU legal constraints. Although the
majority of countries involved in the OECD’s work on patent boxes were not
EU Member States, they were all constrained by the ECJ’s permissive
definition of tax avoidance. This article argues that the tax jurisprudence of
the ECJ placed downward pressure on international tax avoidance standards
and that this in turn shows that countries both within and without the
European Union are losing the ability to prevent international tax avoidance
to the degree that would have been possible in the absence of the ECJ’s tax
jurisprudence. This article refers to this downward pressure as the
Luxembourg effect. This effect is even more important in the context of the
United Kingdom’s “Brexit” vote to leave the European Union since it
highlights that a vote to be free of EU law may not have the desired effect if
even non-EU countries are subject to the consequences of the ECJ’s
jurisprudence.
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INTRODUCTION
For decades, countries have turned to their tax systems to encourage
innovation and entrepreneurship. They have provided tax credits and tax
deductions for research and development expenses (R&D), accelerated
depreciation for assets used in the R&D process, and reduced wage taxes for
the employees engaged in this process. The goal of these tax incentives is to
create an incentive for R&D that will eventually create valuable intellectual
property (IP) in the form of patents, copyrights, and other assets that will
ultimately produce income. 1 In the last several years, more and more
countries have also started to provide reduced tax rates on the income arising
from IP assets as another way to create incentives for R&D. These reduced
rates on IP income take the form of tax incentives referred to as “patent
boxes,” where income from patents and other IP assets is separated from a
taxpayer’s overall income and subjected to lower rates.
In the last decade, well over a dozen countries have implemented
patent boxes and similar tax incentives. Countries that do not have patent
boxes, however, see them as examples of harmful tax competition since at
least some patent boxes can be used to encourage income shifting by
attracting income away from the country where the underlying R&D took
place. Countries without patent boxes thus fear that taxpayers who had
engaged in R&D in their countries (and benefited from their R&D incentives)
could move the income from that R&D to another country, where it would be
taxed at a lower rate.
In 2013, this criticism of patent boxes overlapped with international
criticism of tax avoidance more generally. As newspapers printed stories
about large multinationals avoiding taxation 2 and domestic legislatures
hosted hearings about the same topic, 3 the Organisation for Economic Co1

Different countries define IP differently, and different tax incentives apply to
different categories of IP. When referring to IP generally, this article uses a broad definition
that can encompass the assets protected by any country’s tax incentives for IP. See, e.g.,
World Trade Organization, Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights, Art. 1, para. 2 (“For the purposes of this Agreement, the term “intellectual property”
refers to all categories of intellectual property that are the subject of Sections 1 through 7 of
Part II [i.e., copyright and related rights, trademarks, geographical indications, industrial
designs, patents, layout designs of integrated circuits, and protection of undisclosed
information]”). When referring to IP in the context of the nexus approach, this articles uses
the narrower definition to which the OECD and G-20 countries agreed. See infra note 83 and
accompanying text.
2
See, e.g., Vanessa Barford and Gerry Holt, Google, Amazon, Starbucks: The rise of
“tax shaming,” BBC New Magazine (May 21, 2013); Charles Duhigg and David
Kocieniewski, How Apple Sidesteps Billions in Taxes, NY Times (April 28, 2012).
3
See, e.g.,Testimony of Apple Inc. before the Permanent Subcommittee on
Investigations,
U.S.
Senate
(May
21,
2013),
available
at
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operation and Development (OECD) and the G-20 implemented the Base
Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) Project, which was a two-year project
meant to target international tax avoidance. As part of this project, the OECD
was charged with developing an approach to limit the elements of patent
boxes that encouraged and allowed income shifting between jurisdictions.
The approach that the OECD developed came to be known as the nexus
approach. Under the nexus approach, countries are only permitted to provide
benefits under patent boxes if those benefits are proportionate to the amount
of R&D undertaken by the taxpayer receiving benefits or in the country
providing benefits.
The nexus approach limits revenue loss from patent boxes by
establishing a link between R&D and the income that may benefit, therefore
constraining the ability of taxpayers to shift income between countries. It
does not, however, eliminate all opportunities for income shifting, and it
achieves its goal by creating pressures in favor of restructuring and against
outsourcing and acquisitions, even when outsourcing and acquisition would
not create any income shifting opportunities. And these weaknesses can be
explained with reference to one phenomenon: European Union law.
Twenty-one of the forty-four countries that took part in the BEPS
Project were Member States of the European Union. Therefore, the EU
Member States that took part in the BEPS Project were unwilling to permit
the OECD to issue any requirements or recommendations that would be
inconsistent with European Union law. 4 Since the European Court of Justice
(ECJ) has previously held that domestic R&D credits cannot discriminate
based on the location of the R&D, the nexus approach could not take the most
logical approach, which would have been to establish a nexus between the
location of the R&D and the country providing tax benefits to the income.
Instead, it had to create a less intuitive nexus, between the entity incurring
R&D expenditures and the entity receiving benefits. This version of the nexus
approach will still reduce income shifting, but, because of the constraints
imposed by European Union law, it will create more distortions and more
possibilities for income shifting than a version that focused directly on the
location of the income.
These distortions and income shifting opportunities matter for the
effectiveness of patent boxes and for international tax competition more
generally. But they also illustrate an important phenomenon. Previously,
https://www.apple.com/pr/pdf/Apple_Testimony_to_PSI.pdf; Starbucks, Google and
Amazon grilled over tax avoidance, BBC News (November 12, 2012).
4
The terms “European Union law” and “EU law” are shorthand for the acquis of the
European Union institutions, as well as the Treaty freedoms, cases by the ECJ and the other
courts of the Court of Justice of the European Union interpreting and applying these
freedoms, and relevant directives and regulations.
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discussions of EU law and the ECJ’s jurisprudence have focused primarily
on the internal inconsistency of the cases or the impact of these cases on
Member States. 5 This article argues that these discussions need to also focus
on the impact of EU law on countries outside the European Union as well. As
shown by the nexus approach and other recommendations issued as part of
the BEPS Project, EU law is no longer just a constraint on Member States. It
is now a constraint on other countries as well, since non-EU countries are
now competing in an international tax environment where the Member States
cannot police tax avoidance in the most effective manner. Instead, the ECJ’s
jurisprudence, which has limited the ability of Member States to police tax
avoidance, has also put downward pressure on international anti-avoidance
standards, thereby making it harder for non-EU countries to have robust antiavoidance rules.
In a nod to Anu Bradford’s “Brussels Effect,” which describes how
the EU has heightened regulatory standards in certain areas due to the
combination of EU regulatory authority and market competition, I refer to
this downward pressure on worldwide anti-avoidance standards as the
Luxembourg effect. 6 In areas such as direct taxation, where the EU has no
independent regulatory authority but the ECJ can strike down Member State
provisions for violating the freedoms enshrined in the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), the ECJ’s jurisprudence has
created a vacuum. Member States cannot pass laws or regulations that violate
the Treaty freedoms, but EU institutions also cannot fill this void by passing
EU-wide laws or regulations. What the BEPS Project and its outputs reveal
is that this vacuum has effects outside of the European Union. Even though
the United States and the majority of OECD members were not Member
States of the EU, their efforts to combat tax avoidance through the BEPS
Project were constrained by EU law, and they now face an international tax
environment where it will be difficult to pass anti-avoidance legislation that
is more robust than the low standard permitted by the ECJ. This in turn raises
significant concerns about the future of international cooperation. If EU law
places limits on what non-EU countries can agree to in international
negotiations, that is important for those countries to know as they enter into
future negotiations or large-scale projects such as the BEPS Project.
In order to illustrate the long reach of EU law, this article proceeds in
three section. Section I introduces patent boxes and the nexus approach. This
is the first in-depth description of the nexus approach in the literature, and it
5

See, e.g., Ruth Mason & Michael S. Knoll, What Is Tax Discrimination?, 121 YALE
L.J. 1014 (2012); Michael J. Graetz & Alvin C. Warren, Jr., Income Tax Discrimination and
the Political and Economic Integration of Europe, 115 YALE L.J. 1186 (2006);
6
This terminology refers to the fact that the primary seat of the European Court of
Justice is in Luxembourg.
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highlights the fact that the nexus approach in fact has two versions: the main
“entity version,” which is subject to the constraints imposed by EU law, and
the “location version,” which is hidden in the footnotes of the report
describing the approach and which is not subject to those same constraints.
Section II introduces the Luxembourg effect and argues that EU law explains
why the entity version of the nexus approach was adopted, even though it
creates distortions and income shifting opportunities relative to the location
version. This Section sets out the three requirements for the Luxembourg
effect and explains why the Luxembourg effect illustrates a significant cost
of the recent “Brexit” vote for the United Kingdom that has not previously
been acknowledged. This Section also argues that EU law imposed limits on
some of the other outputs of the BEPS Project as well. Section III considers
several possible responses to the Luxembourg effect. Since none of these
responses appear likely in the short term, Section III concludes that the first
step toward addressing the Luxembourg effect is to acknowledge it.
Discussions of EU law must focus on its effect outside the EU as well as
inside the EU, and negotiators, lawyers, and academics outside the EU must
realize that the ECJ is changing the legal environment for everyone, not just
the Member States of the European Union.
I.

PATENT BOXES AND THE NEXUS APPROACH

In order to illustrate the long reach of EU law, Section I first
introduces readers to patent boxes and then outlines the two versions of the
nexus approach.
A. An Introduction to Patent Boxes
Studies have shown that R&D leads to greater economic growth, 7 but
private parties underfund R&D because they do not necessarily benefit from
all the positive spillovers associated with innovation. 8 In response to this
market failure, countries have stepped in to use their tax systems to create
incentives for research and development (R&D). Countries and states have
encouraged R&D by granting credits, deductions, and super-deductions for
7

See, e.g., Michael J. Graetz & Rachael Doud, Technological Innovation,
International Competition, and the Challenges of International Income Taxation, 113
Colum. L. Rev. 347, 348 (2013) (stating that the “importance of technological development
to economic growth has been accepted ever since” Robert Solow’s 1957 paper).
8
Graetz & Doud, supra note 7, at 349-50; European Commission, A Study on R&D
Tax Incentives: Final Report, TAXUD/2013/DE/315 at 18 (November 28, 2014) (hereinafter
“EU Commission 2014”) (“markets left on their own will probably generate less innovation
than would be desirable from society’s point of view. The reason is that knowledge is not
completely excludable [and] investments in innovation are more risky”).
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R&D expenditures, accelerated depreciation for machinery and other assets
used as part of R&D projects, and reduced wage taxes for employees engaged
in R&D, among other incentives. 9 These tax incentives all apply to the inputs
to innovation, since they provide benefits at the time R&D is undertaken by
providing credits or deductions based on the amount of R&D expenditures.10
In recent years, over a dozen jurisdictions have also implemented tax
incentives that provide benefits to the outputs from innovation. In other
words, rather than providing benefits at the time that a taxpayer engages in
R&D, these tax incentives provide reduced rates to income arising from the
IP assets that resulted from that R&D.
The primary example of an output-based incentive is a patent box,
which taxes income from patents (and sometimes other IP assets) at a reduced
rate. These tax incentives are sometimes also called innovation boxes,
knowledge development boxes, IP regimes, or the like, but this article uses
the term “patent box” to refer to all regimes that provide a reduced rate to
income from IP assets. Patent boxes first originated in Europe, 11 and their
name is generally thought to refer to the box that taxpayers need to check off
on a tax return in order to benefit from the reduced rate. Variations of these
tax incentives are now in many non-European countries, including
Colombia, 12 China, 13 Israel, 14 and Turkey. 15 The design of these incentives
9

For a sense of the scale of tax incentives for R&D, see EU Commission 2014, supra
note 8 (finding that the 33 countries studied in that article had a total of 80 R&D incentives).
10
For a more detailed description of the variety of R&D incentives that are available,
see, e.g., EU Commission 2014, supra note 8.
11
France and Ireland first introduced incentives for patent income in the 1970s and
1980s, but the trend of providing benefits for patent income did not take off for several more
decades. In the interim, Ireland eliminated this incentive. See Graetz & Doud, supra note 7,
at 352.
12
See Andrea Prieto, Colombia Decree 121/2014: National Council of Tax Benefits
in Science, Technology and Innovation – regulations issued, Tax News Service (Sept. 11,
2014) (describing benefits provided to “new medical products and the software made in
Colombia”). The Colombian regime is noticeably different from most other patent boxes in
that it focuses entirely on income from software, but it is an output incentive that applies to
income from IP assets (i.e., software), and the OECD listed it in its lists of potentially harmful
IP regimes subject to the nexus approach. See Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development, Action 5: 2015 Final Report, Countering Harmful Tax Practices More
Effectively, Taking into Account Transparency and Substance, (hereinafter “Action 5 Final
Report”), 63.
13
See Shi Qi Ma, Corporate Taxation – China (People’s Rep.), IBFD (2015), 30
(describing the benefits provided for “high-new technology enterprise[s]”).
14
See Ministry of Finance, Opportunity Israel (Fall 2012), 27-28 (describing the
regime provided to “preferred enterprises”).
15
See Republic of Turkey Prime Ministry, Investment Support and Promotion
Agency,
Investors’
Guide,
Special
Investment
Zones,
available
at
http://www.invest.gov.tr/enUS/investmentguide/investorsguide/Pages/SpecialInvestmentZones.aspx (describing the
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varies, with some only applying to income from patents 16 and others
extending benefits to income from copyrights, trademarks, brands, knowhow, and other forms of intellectual property. 17 They also vary in terms of
what type of income can qualify. Some only permit royalties from the sale or
licensing of IP assets to qualify, 18 while others allow so-called “embedded
royalties” to qualify for benefits, which means that the reduced rate will apply
to a portion of all the sales income from a good or service that was developed
using the IP asset. 19 Depending on the scope of the IP assets and the income
that can qualify, therefore, patent boxes can provide benefits to taxpayers in
a wide variety of industries ranging from pharmaceuticals and software to
fashion design and car manufacturing.
By 2013, patent boxes were in the news as more and more countries
adopted them. 20 Although these regimes had briefly been introduced in the
1970s, 21 it was not until the Netherlands adopted its innovation box in 2007
advantages provided to Technology Development Zones).
16
Belgium and the United Kingdom are countries that limit benefits to income from
patents and extensions of patents. Marc De Mil & Tom Wallyn, 100A IFA Cahiers (Tax
Incentives on R&D) 145,158-59 (2015); UK Corporation Tax Act 2010 Part 8A (last
amended by Finance Act 2015 (Mar. 26, 2015)).
17
See, e.g., Netherlands Corporate Income Tax Act Art. 12b (last amended by Law
No. 35144 (Dec. 30, 2013)) (providing benefits to patented assets as well as intangible assets
arising from R&D that received an R&D certificate under the Dutch Income Tax and Social
Insurance Premium Relief Act); Spain Corporate Income Tax Act ch. 4 sec. 35 (last amended
by Law No. 1/2014 Feb. 28, 2014) (providing benefits to patents, designs or models, plans,
formulas or secret procedures, and rights on information concerning industrial, commercial
or scientific know-how). Only a few, however, go so far as to extend to trademarks and
marketing-related IP assets. Jurisdictions with innovation boxes that extend to marketingrelated intangibles includes Hungary and Luxembourg. Borbála Kolozs & Annamária
Koszegi, 100A IFA Cahiers (Tax Incentives on R&D) 365, 375 (2015); Frank van Kuijk, The
Luxembourg IP Tax Regime, 39 Intertax 140, 141 (Mar. 2011).
18
Countries that apply this limit include Hungary. Kolozs & Koszegi, supra note 17,
at 376. France also does not permit certain types of embedded IP income to qualify for
benefits. Georges Cavalier & Jean-Luc Pierre, 100A IFA Cahiers (Tax Incentives for R&D)
303, 312 (2015) (noting that embedded royalties earned by companies that exploit their own
IP may not qualify for benefits).
19
Countries that provide benefits for embedded IP income include Belgium, Israel,
the Netherlands, Turkey, and the United Kingdom. Eric Warson & Ruth Claes, The Belgian
Patent Income Deduction, 50 Eur. Tax'n 319, 322-23 (July 2010); Leon Harris, Government
Upgrades Company Tax Breaks, 61 Tax Notes Int’l 564, 565 (Feb. 21, 2011); Margreet
Nijhof & Michiel Kloes, An Improved Tax Regime for Intangibles in the Netherlands, 58
Tax Notes Int’l 69, 69 (Apr. 5, 2010); Bilur Yalti, Turkey – Corporate Taxation (IBFD 2015)
at 16; UK Corporation Tax Act 2010 Part 8A (last amended by Finance Act 2015 (Mar. 26,
2015)).
20
See Annika Breidthardt, Germany calls on EU to ban “patent box” tax breaks,
Reuters UK (July 9, 2013); Vanessa Houlder & Quentin Peel, UK under pressure from Berlin
over tax competition, Financial Times (June 13, 2013).
21
See supra note 11.
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and the United Kingdom implemented its patent box in 2013 that
commentators focused in on the costs and benefits of these tax regimes.
Critics of these tax incentives argued that they were poorly targeted, 22 that
they did not increase R&D sufficiently to offset their significant cost, 23 and
that they encouraged income shifting and base stripping. 24 Advocates argued
that they were necessary to maintain a jurisdiction’s competitiveness and
keep R&D in the jurisdiction in the face of the growing number of patent
boxes. 25 Despite these arguments, empirical literature on the effectiveness
22

This argument focuses on the fact that the benefits of patent boxes apply to income
from patents, which in turn means that the benefits are only granted to taxpayers that already
have income-generating patents. They therefore apply after the decision to research was
made, and their application only to successful innovation means that they likely do not
provide benefits to many of the innovators producing positive societal spillovers, particularly
since the type of R&D that is most likely to be underfunded and that is also most likely to
create positive spillovers appears to be basic R&D, much of which may not lead directly to
income production. See, e.g., EU Commission 2014, supra note 8, at 6 (stating that IP rights
“enable firms to capture a large part of the societal benefits, such that the need for a tax
incentive for protected innovations becomes unclear”); EU Commission 2014, supra note 8,
at 45 (stating that “by subsidizing inventions that do not need a subsidy, patent boxes would
induce inventions that are difficult to patent (and therefore might have high spillovers)
relatively less attractive”); Martin A. Sullivan, A History Lesson for A Future Patent Box,
Tax Notes (Sept. 7, 2015), 1036, 1038 (hereinafter “Sullivan Sept. 2015”) (“There is no
readily apparent economic justification for granting patented technologies more favorable
tax treatment than other IP (and in fact, some would argue that there is less of a reason since
this property already enjoys government-favored status)”); Martin A. Sullivan, Economic
Analysis: Patent Boxes, Research Credits, or Lower Rates?, Tax Notes (June 1, 2015)
(hereinafter “Sullivan June 2015”) (stating that a patent box “wastes tax benefits on income
from prior research that is now manifesting itself in current income – a windfall for prior
work that provides no incentive for new effort”).
23
The empirical literature on patent boxes does not conclusively show whether patent
boxes increase R&D. Although one 2015 paper found that, “for each percentage point
reduction in the [corporate income tax] rate thanks to the patent box, the likelihood of
registering a patent in the country concerned will rise” significantly across industries, a
further finding of that same study, was that, unless they require that development take place
in the jurisdiction, patent boxes decrease the probability of inventors moving to the
jurisdiction offering the patent box. Annette Alstadsaeter, Salvador Barrios, Gaetan
Nicodeme, Agnieszka Maria Skonieczna, and Antonio Vezzani, IPTS Working Papers on
Corporate R&D and Innovation – No 6/2015: Patent Boxes Design, Patents Location and
Local R&D, 12. Other studies, however, have suggested that patent boxes, even if they do
not increase overall revenue, do attract IP income to the jurisdiction. Rachel Griffith, Helen
Miller, & Martin O’Connell, Ownership of intellectual property and corporate taxation, 112
J. Pub. Econ. 12, 22 (2014).
24
See Breidthardt, supra note 20; Houlder & Peel, supra note 20.
25
See, e.g., Boustany and Neal Release Patent box Discussion Draft, July 29, 2015,
available at http://boustany.house.gov/114th-congress/boustany-neal-release-innovationbox-discussion-draft/ (hereinafter “Boustany Neal Press Release”) (quoting the legislators
that proposed the U.S. patent box as wanting to “begin the conversation on how the United
States can attract and retain the brightest minds and best ideas on Earth” and “attract
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and cost efficiency of patent boxes is quite limited. 26 To the extent that there
are empirical findings in this area, studies suggest that patent boxes that
reduce the corporate income tax rate will lead to an increased likelihood that
patents (particularly high-quality patents 27) will be registered in the country
providing the patent box,28 an increased amount of IP income in that
jurisdiction, 29 and a reduction in that jurisdiction’s tax revenue. 30 Studies
have not yet been able to determine conclusively whether patent boxes lead
to an increase in overall R&D, although at least one recent study suggests that
in-country R&D increases if a patent box requires that R&D be undertaken
in the jurisdiction. 31
Even without empirical data showing the actual effect of patent boxes
on the overall amount of R&D, countries continue to implement them, and
taxpayers have increased their demands for these regimes. By 2013, over a
dozen patent boxes and similar tax incentives had been implemented in
OECD and G-20 members. 32 Several more existed in the European Union
and European Economic Area, with Cyprus, Liechtenstein, and Malta all

innovation and the high-paying, high-quality jobs that come with it”); Government of the
United Kingdom, Corporate Tax Reform, 51 (November 29, 2010) (explaining the proposed
patent box by stating that “[t]he Patent box will aim to reward successful technical
innovation. The Government believes that it is right to introduce this reform now in order to
prevent movement of IP offshore and encourage the development of new patents by UK
businesses, protecting and enhancing the status of the UK as a world leader in this field.”).
Another argument that was not made by patent box advocates but that could have supported
their arguments is based on a 2001 paper by Michael Keen, which suggested that preferential
regimes could in fact reduce overall competition by focusing this competition on specific tax
bases (i.e., geographically mobile income) rather than allowing jurisdictions to compete
across multiple tax bases. Michael Keen, Preferential Regimes Can Make Tax Competition
Less Harmful, National Tax Journal Vol. LIV, No. 4, 757 (December 2001). According to
this view of preferential regimes, tax competition that focuses only on a specific tax base
(say, IP income) will not reduce revenue as much as tax competition that cuts across all
income sources. According to this argument, then, another reason to support patent boxes is
that they could theoretically be beneficial by focusing tax competition on income from IP
assets, although Keen emphasized that his results were limited to the narrow two-country
situation on which his model was based.
26
Graetz & Doud, supra note 7, at 375 (concluding in 2013 that “the extant data is
too limited to adequately assess the effectiveness of patent boxes”).
27
Alstadsaeter et al., supra note 23, at 15.
28
Alstadsaeter et al., supra note 23, at 12.
29
Griffith et al., supra note 23.
30
Griffith et al., supra note 23.
31
Alstadsaeter et al., supra note 23, at 19.
32
See Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Action 5: 2014
Deliverable, Countering Harmful Tax Practices More Effectively, Taking into Account
Transparency and Substance (hereinafter “Action 5 Progress Report”) (listing fifteen IP
regimes that had been identified by 2014).
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implementing patent boxes with tax rates ranging from 0% to 2.5%. 33
Although the provisions that existed in 2013 all provided reduced rates to
income from IP, they varied significantly in the benefits that they provided.
The tax rates applied to IP income by existing patent boxes ranged from 0%
to 19%. 34 As mentioned above, the IP assets that could benefit ranged from
only patents and extensions of patents to everything from copyrighted
software to know-how and trademarks, 35 and the income that could benefit
also ranged from only royalties and licensing income to embedded royalties
from the sale of goods and services. 36 These regimes also varied in terms of
whether they limited benefits based on who developed the IP or where the
R&D took place. At least one country historically granted benefits only to
income from IP that had been entirely developed by the taxpayer, 37 but the
33

See European Parliament, Directorate-General for Internal Policies, Intellectual
Property Box Regimes (2015), at 7.
34
This range applies to the national-level IP regimes that are listed in Action 5 Final
Report, supra note 12, and that were in effect at the time of publication. The rate that applies
under the Belgian patent Income Deduction is 6.8%. Warson & Claes, supra note 19, at 319;
Peter R. Merrill, James R. Shanahan Jr., José Elías Tomé Gómez, Guillaume Glon, Paul
Grocott, Auke Lamers, Diarmuid MacDougal, Alina Macovei, Rémi Montredon, Thierry
Vanwelkenhuyzen, Alexandru Cernat, Stephen Merriman, Rachel Moore, Gregg Muresan,
Pieter Van Den Berghe, and Andrea Linczer, Is It Time for the U.S. to Consider the Patent
Box?, 134 Tax Notes 1665, 1666 (March 26, 2012). The rate under China’s Reduced Rate
for New & High Tech Enterprises ranges from 0% to 12.5%. Bernard Knight & Goud
Maragini, It Is Time for the United States to Implement a Patent Box Tax Regime to
Encourage Domestic Manufacturing, 19 Stan. J. L. Bus. & Fin. 39, 50 (2013). The rate under
Colombia’s software regime is 0%. Catalina Hoyos Jimenéz, Colombia – Corporate
Taxation (IBFD, 2015),19-20. The rate under France’s regime is 15%. Cavalier & Pierre,
supra note 18, at 313; Knight & Maragini, supra note 34, at 50. The rate of the Hungarian
regime is 9.5%. Gabor Koka, Changes to Intellectual Property Box Regime Take Effect, 65
Tax Notes Int'l 345, 345 (Jan. 30, 2012). The rate under Israel’s regime varies from 9% to
16%. Henriette Fuchs, Israel – Corporate Taxation (IBFD, 2015). The rate under the
Luxembourg regime is 5.76%. van Kuijk, supra note 17, at 140. The rate under the Dutch
regime is 5%. Nijhof & Kloes, supra note 19, at 69. The rate under the Portuguese regime
will decrease from 19% to 17% by 2018. Tiago Cassiano Neves, Opening Pandora’s Box:
10 International Effects of Portugal's Corporate Tax Reform, Tax Notes Int’l 1223, 1224
(Sep. 23, 2013). The rate under the Spanish regime is 5%. Jason M. Brown, Patent Box
Taxation: A Comparison of Four Recent Europea patent Box Tax Regimes and an Analytical
Consideration of If and How the United States Should Implement Its Own Patent Box, 46
Int’l Law. 913, 927 (2012). The rate under the Turkish regime, which provides a 50%
exemption, is 10%. See Yalti, supra note 19 (stating that the Turkish corporate rate is 20%).
The effective rate under the UK regime is 10%. Tom Scott & James Ross, The New Patent
Box Regime and Corporate Tax Reform in the UK, Int’l Tax J. (Oct. 2012).
35
See supra note 16-17.
36
See supra note 18-19.
37
See Lisa Evers, Helen Miller, & Christoph Spengel, Intellectual Property Box
Regimes: Effective Tax Rates and Tax Policy Considerations, Centre for European Economic
Research Discussion Paper No. 13-070 (Nov. 2013) 10 (describing the previous version of
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majority of patent boxes that existed in 2013 also granted benefits to IP that
was not self-developed but that was acquired or developed through
outsourcing. 38 Some patent boxes outside the EU also imposed limitations
based on jurisdiction, only providing benefits when the R&D that contributed
to the income was done in the jurisdiction providing benefits. 39 Patent boxes
that had no limits on acquisition, outsourcing, or the location of the R&D
provided the greatest benefit to taxpayers, 40 while those that restricted
benefits to self-developed IP or IP developed in the jurisdiction were the least
generous.
As more European countries adopted patent boxes that did not require
that the R&D be done in the jurisdiction, countries that were known for
having significant amounts of domestic R&D but that did not have patent
boxes, such as Germany and the United States, feared that these tax incentives
would lead to lower revenues as IP was shifted outside of their jurisdictions
and into jurisdictions with patent boxes. 41 Several tax reform proposals from
Chairman Camp’s “Option C” from 2011 to proposals from Senator Feinstein
in 2012 and from Representatives Boustany and Schwartz in 2013 included
designs for a U.S. patent box,42 and multiple commentators wrote advocacy
pieces calling for such an incentive in the U.S. 43 At the same time, the
countries that did have patent boxes feared that they were losing the ability
to tax IP income to other jurisdictions with even more favorable patent boxes.
For example, as countries such as Malta and Cyprus implemented patent
boxes with rates that were well below 10% and that did not require that the
R&D take place in the jurisdiction, Spain modified its patent box to both
reduce the rate that applied to IP income and eliminate the requirement that
the Spanish innovation box).
38
Many patent boxes did, however, place limits on either how much R&D can be
outsourced or from whom IP can be acquired. For example, both the Netherlands and the
United Kingdom allow outsourcing and acquisition, but they require that the resident owner
of the IP have taken on the risk associated with that IP. Nijhof & Kloes, supra note 19, at 70;
HM Revenue & Customs, Patent Box: qualifying companies: groups: active ownership
condition (CIRD 210210). Belgium applies a similar requirement that the “overall
responsibility and management of the R&D activities” must rest with the Belgian company.
De Mil & Wallyn, supra note 16, at 160. Luxembourg limits acquisitions between related
parties. Van Kuijk, supra note 17, at 143.
39
Regimes with jurisdictional limitations include those in China and Israel. W.
Wesley Hill & J. Sims Rhyne, III, Opening Pandora’s Box: Global Intellectual Property Tax
Incentives and Their Implications for the United States, 53. Intell. Prop. L. Rev. 371, 385
(2013); Harris, supra note 19, at 565.
40
See Alstadsaeter et al., supra note 23 (finding that allowing acquired patents to
benefit increases the tax advantage).
41
See Breidthardt, supra note 20; Houlder & Peel, supra note 20.
42
See Jane G. Gravelle, A U.S. Patent Box: Issues, Congressional Research Service
Insight (Oct. 15, 2015).
43
See, e.g., Merrill et al., supra note 34.
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qualifying IP be self-developed, thereby making it easier for more taxpayers
to benefit from the lowered rate. 44
It was against the backdrop of these debates that the Organisation of
Economic Co-operation and Development started work on its two-year
project to combat corporate tax avoidance. This project, which was known as
the Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) Project, was a fifteen-point
international tax reform project under which the OECD was granted authority
by the G-20. 45 The BEPS Project garnered significant political support and
attention, partly because international tax avoidance itself was receiving so
much attention at the time the project was announced. 46 The project was first
proposed in the form of the BEPS Report, which laid out the general
challenges facing the international tax system, 47 and the fifteen specific
Action Items were then set out in more detail in the BEPS Action Plan in July
2013. 48
Prior to this project, the OECD had already been active in
international tax policy. 49 The OECD has a Model Tax Convention, the
changes to which are the subject of many OECD working party meetings, and
the OECD encourages information sharing through the Global Forum on
Transparency and Tax Administration. 50 The OECD also sets out transfer
pricing guidelines that are often discussed in working party meetings, 51 and
it has published numerous reports on topics ranging from aggressive tax

44

Compare Evers et al., supra note 37, at 10 (describing the 2008 version of the
Spanish IP box and stating that “only self-developed IP qualifies without exceptions”) with
Spain Corporate Income Tax Act ch. 4 sec. 35 (last amended by Law No. 1/2014 Feb. 28,
2014) (allowing for some IP that was not self-developed to qualify).
45
See Itai Grinberg, Breaking BEPS: The New International Tax Diplomacy, ___
Geo. L. J. ____ (forthcoming), for a description of the top-down nature of the BEPS Project.
46
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Addressing Base
Erosion and Profit Shifting (February 12, 2013) (hereinafter “BEPS Report”). See supra
notes 2-3; Grinberg, supra note 45, at __ (providing examples of how international tax
avoidance has become “front-page news”).
47
BEPS Report, supra note 46.
48
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Action Plan on Base
Erosion and Profit Shifting (July 19, 2013) (hereinafter “BEPS Action Plan”).
49
For further discussions of the role of the OECD in tax matters, see, e.g., Grinberg,
supra note 45; Allison Christians, Networks, Norms, and National Tax Policy, 9 Wash. U.
Global Studies L. Rev. 1 (2010); Hugh Ault, Reflections on the Role of the OECD in
Developing International Tax Norms, 34 Brook. J. Int’l. L. 757 (2009).
50
See Grinberg, supra note 45.
51
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Transfer Pricing
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations (2010).
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planning 52 to bribery and corruption 53 to the taxation of high net worth
individuals. 54 Institutionally, the OECD’s work on international tax issues is
carried out by the Committee on Fiscal Affairs, which is made up of highlevel tax officials in each member country; the Centre for Tax Policy and
Administration, which is made up of OECD staff; and a variety of working
groups and expert groups that meet several times per year to discuss various
international tax topics. 55 The BEPS Project therefore fit into the existing
international tax work that had previously been undertaken by the OECD, but
it added all G-20 countries that were not also OECD members to the
discussions and it brought with it an accelerated time scale and significantly
more publicity and media attention than had attached to previous OECD tax
projects.
As part of this project, Action 5 of the BEPS Action Plan required the
OECD to “[r]evamp the work on harmful tax practices with a priority on …
requiring substantial activity for any preferential regime.” 56 Although this
mandate did not mention patent boxes, observers, delegates, and OECD staff
read the Action 5 mandate to mean that the BEPS Project had to determine
how to align the benefits granted by patent boxes with the substantial
activities that led to the income receiving benefits. This work was placed
within the context of the OECD’s ongoing work on “harmful tax practices,”
which had begun in 1998, when the OECD published Harmful Tax
Competition: An Emerging Global Issue (known as “the 1998 Report”) and
created the Forum on Harmful Tax Practices (the “FHTP”). 57 The 1998
Report marked a new phase in international tax cooperation for several
reasons. First, the 1998 Report did not just focus on general themes of
cooperation and consensus. Instead, it focused on individual regimes
implemented by individual countries, and its mere existence suggested that
countries were complicit in the race to the bottom. Second, creating the FHTP
at the same time as the 1998 Report was published ensured that this focus
52
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Tackling Aggressive
Tax Planning through Improved Transparency and Disclosure (2011); Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development, Corporate Loss Utilisation through Aggressive
Tax Planning (2011).
53
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Bribery and
Corruption Awareness Handbook for Tax Examiners and Tax Auditors (2013).
54
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Engaging with High
Net Worth Individuals on Tax Compliance (2009).
55
See Ault, supra note 49, at 761-762.
56
BEPS Action Plan, supra note 48, at 18.
57
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Harmful Tax
Competition: An Emerging Global Issue (1998) (hereinafter “1998 Report”). See Ault, supra
note 49, at 767 (“The Report established a new subsidiary body within the OECD, the Forum
on Harmful Tax Practices, which, since 1998, has administered a set of guidelines on tax
practices setting out certain obligations on countries that adopted the Report”).
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would continue for many years. Third, other portions of the 1998 Report
suggested that it was not merely individual regimes that could be harmful but
that entire countries could be named as tax havens. Although this part of the
OECD’s work fell by the wayside over several years, 58 it does highlight the
country-specific focus of the FHTP’s continued work. Fourth, the framework
that was established in the 1998 Report still informs the work of the FHTP,
and that framework has a very specific view of what it means for a regime to
represent harmful tax competition. Under that framework, if a regime applies
a preferential low tax rate to geographically mobile income and is ring-fenced
(i.e., the low rate is not available to domestic taxpayers) or lacks transparency
or effective information sharing, then that regime will be listed in later reports
by the FHTP as “potentially harmful.” 59 Once a regime is found to be
58

Compare 1998 Report, supra note 57, at 21-22 (setting out the factors for
identifying tax havens), with Action 5 Final Report, supra note 12, at 15-16 (listing the work
of the FHTP since the 1998 Report).
59
The 1998 Report describes this requirement by setting out twelve factors for the
FHTP to consider when determining whether a jurisdiction has implemented a harmful
regime. Four of these factors are labeled as “key factors,” which means that they are
sufficient for a finding of harmfulness, while the other eight factors can indicate harmfulness.
1998 Report, supra note 57, at 26-34. The interpretation and interaction of these twelve
factors was further elaborated in several later OECD publications. Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development, The OECD’s Project on Harmful Tax Practices:
2006 Update on Progress in Member Countries (2006), available at
www.oecd.org/ctp/harmful/37446434.pdf; Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development, Consolidated Application Note: Guidance in Applying the 1998 Report to
Preferential Tax Regimes (2004, available at www.oecd.org/ctp/harmful/30901132.pdf;
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Harmful Tax Practices: The
2004 Progress Report (2004), available at www.oecd.org/ctp/harmful/30901115.pdf
(hereinafter “2004 Progress Report”); Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development, The OECD’s Project on Harmful Tax Practices: The 2001 Progress Report
(2002), available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264033993-en; Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development, Towards Global Tax Co-operation: Progress in
Identifying and Eliminating Harmful Tax Practices (2001), available at http://dx.doi.org/
10.1787/9789264184541-en. The key factors from the 1998 Report are (i) that the regime
applies no tax rate or a low effective tax rate, (ii) that the regime is ring-fenced (i.e., the
benefits are not fully available to domestic taxpayers), (iii) that the regime lacks
transparency, and (iv) that the regime lacks effective exchange of information. 1998 Report,
supra note 57, at 26-30. In practice, the first factor is necessary but not sufficient for a finding
of harmfulness, so one of the following three factors must also be evident for such a finding.
Along with these four key factors, a regime must also be within the scope of the 1998 Report,
which means that it must apply to geographically mobile income and be preferential (i.e., it
must apply a more favorable rate than the general rate that would apply to corporate income).
1998 Report, supra note 57, at 25-26. Therefore, as envisioned in the 1998 Report, a harmful
regime must apply a preferential low rate to geographically mobile income and either be
ring-fenced or lack transparency or effective exchange of information. The further eight
factors were listed as possible further indicators of harmfulness that must be considered, but
they were not necessary for any such finding. 1998 Report, supra note 57, at 30-34.
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potentially harmful, then it must go through an assessment of “actual
harmfulness,” where the FHTP will consider economic data to determine
whether the regime is in fact promoting harmful tax competition. If the
regime has is actually harmful, other jurisdictions may impose defensive
measures. Since 1998, many jurisdictions have opted to amend or abolish
their regimes rather than risk either a label of potential harmfulness or actual
harmfulness. 60
This earlier work on harmful tax practices provided the context for
the OECD’s work on patent boxes. Despite the lack of any language in the
BEPS Action Plan that focused on patent boxes, the OECD and G-20 member
countries involved in this work interpreted the Action 5 mandate to mean that
the FHTP should first focus on requiring substantial activities in what they
referred to as “preferential IP regimes” (i.e., patent boxes), after which the
work would then focus on other preferential regimes. In short, Action Item 5
provided an opportunity for the FHTP to focus on patent boxes, but it did so
within the context of a broader project and with the involvement of nonOECD G-20 members that had not been involved in any of the FHTP’s
previous work.
As mentioned above, the literature on the effectiveness of patent
boxes is still quite limited, and it was even more so at the time of the BEPS
Project. The OECD therefore had to decide how to address the challenges
created by patent boxes, and it effectively split the difference between
eliminating patent boxes entirely and allowing them to remain as they were
in 2013. Action 5 of the BEPS Report says nothing about eliminating patent
boxes entirely, but it also does not permit the OECD and G-20 to leave
existing patent boxes standing. Instead, it mandated that the FHTP require
substantial activities of these regimes. While countries with patent boxes
might have preferred that patent boxes be left entirely unlimited and countries
without patent boxes might have preferred that patent boxes be eliminated
entirely, the OECD chose at the start of the BEPS Project to take neither of
those routes and instead to require that patent boxes only provide tax benefits
to income that arose from substantial activities.
This decision was not without empirical support. As mentioned
earlier, although the literature on the effectiveness of patent boxes remains
fairly inconclusive, at least one empirical study does suggest that requiring
60
Ault, supra note 49, at 767-768 (stating that the 1998 Report and the subsequent
FHTP process have “been extremely effective in bringing countries to eliminate regimes
found to be harmful under the criteria of the Report. Of the forty-seven / preferential tax
regimes that had been identified as potentially harmful in 2000, none of the regimes are
deemed harmful at the present time. A number of regimes have been abolished, others have
been amended to remove their potentially harmful features, and still others were found not
to be harmful on further analysis of their actual impact”).
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that underlying R&D be done in the jurisdiction has the effect of increasing
R&D, while patent boxes that do not have this jurisdictional requirement may
in fact decrease R&D in the jurisdiction.61 Furthermore, there were clear
political reasons for making the decision not to eliminate patent boxes but
also not to allow them to stand unchallenged. Within the OECD, a significant
minority of jurisdictions had patent boxes. These included Belgium, France,
Luxembourg, Spain, and the United Kingdom. 62 These countries were
unwilling to eliminate their boxes entirely, particularly since many, such as
the United Kingdom, had staked significant political capital on the creation
of these regimes. 63 Jurisdictions without patent boxes, such as Germany,
Japan, and the United States, however, were themselves unwilling to allow
these regimes to exist without any restrictions, given that these regimes could
lead to IP assets that had been created in a jurisdiction without a patent box
to be acquired by a taxpayer in a jurisdiction with a patent box just as the IP
assets began to produce income. One justification for front-end R&D
incentives is that the revenue foregone in subsidizing R&D will be recaptured
in the form of tax revenue if and when that R&D is successful and produces
income. If, however, other jurisdictions have patent boxes that create
incentives to shift that income away from the jurisdiction that funded the
underlying R&D, then jurisdictions without patent boxes feared that they
would just be funding R&D without ever being able to tax the income that
arose out of it. Jurisdictions without patent boxes, particularly those with
larger economies and more significant R&D infrastructure, therefore had an
interest in requiring that those regimes only be permitted to the extent that
R&D was also undertaken in the jurisdiction providing the box. Although this
could be seen as encouraging jurisdictions with patent boxes to compete over
not just the rate of the box but also the environment for R&D, it suggests that
the countries supporting a substance requirement were confident that they
could prevail in the latter type of competition, while the same might not have
been true in the context of a competition over rates.
B. An Introduction to the Nexus Approach
The FHTP therefore had to create a new approach to defining
substantial activities. This new approach, referred to as the “nexus
approach,” 64 was unveiled in the 2014 Progress Report, although not all
61

Alstadsaeter et al., supra note 23, at 12.
See Action 5 Progress Report, supra note 32, at 59.
63
See, e.g., Vanessa Houlder, Treasury sets out patent incentive expansion, Financial
Times (June 10, 2011).
64
Note that some commentators have referred to this as the “modified nexus
approach” due to its many iterations in 2014 and 2015. The nexus approach and the modified
62
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jurisdictions had yet reached consensus on it. 65 On November 11, 2014, after
the 2014 Progress Report was published, the United Kingdom and Germany
announced that they had reached a compromise that would lead to acceptance
of the nexus approach by all forty-four countries participating in the BEPS
Project. 66 The EU Code of Conduct Group then adopted the nexus approach
that the FHTP had designed at the end of 2014. 67 On February 6, 2015, the
OECD itself issued a press release announcing that the nexus approach had
been accepted and pledging to finish work on the approach by the end of June
2015. 68 In October 2015, the OECD issued the final report on Action 5, which
was then accepted by the G-20, 69 and this 2015 Report set out the final
description of the nexus approach. 70
Under this approach, patent boxes and other IP regimes will not be
found to be harmful if they require a nexus between the expenditures that
contributed to the value of the IP income and the IP income that receives
benefits. This nexus is represented by the following equation 71:
Qualifying expenditures incurred
to develop IP asset
x
Overall expenditures incurred
to develop IP asset

Overall income =
from IP asset

Income receiving
tax benefits

Due to a political compromise between the UK and Germany,
jurisdictions can permit taxpayers to increase the amount of qualifying

nexus approach are one and the same, and this article uses the former term to avoid confusion.
65
Action 5 Progress Report, supra note 32, at 28-29.
66
German Federal Ministry of Finance, Germany and UK agree joint proposal for
rules on preferential IP regimes (November 11, 2014), available at
www.budesfinanzministerium.de/Content/EN/Pressemitteilungen/2014/2014-11-11-ruleson-preferential-ip-regimes.html (hereinafter “German press release”); HM Treasury, HM
Revenue & Customs, and the Rt Hon George Osborne MP, Germany and UK agree joint
proposal for rules on preferential IP regimes (November 11, 2014), available at
www.gov.uk/government/news/germany-and-uk-agree-joint-proposal-for-rules-onpreferential-ip-regimes (hereinafter “UK press release”).
67
See Bob van der Meade, EU Update on patent boxes and the EU Code of Conduct
Group,
International
Tax
Review,
available
at
http://www.internationaltaxreview.com/Article/3430573/EU-Update-on-patent-boxes-andthe-EU-Code-of-Conduct-Group-Business-Taxation.html; Council of the European Union,
Outcome of the Council Meeting, News Release 16603/14 (Dec. 9, 2014).
68
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Action 5: Agreement
on Modified Nexus Approach for IP Regimes (Feb. 6, 2015) (hereinafter “Feb. 2015
Agreement”).
69
Action 5 Final Report, supra note 12.
70
For the full description of the nexus approach, see Action 5 Final Report, supra note
12, at 24-36.
71
Action 5 Final Report, supra note 12, at 25.
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expenditures by 30% so long as the resulting ratio does not exceed 100%. 72
The nexus approach sets the outer limits within which patent boxes will be
found not to be harmful. The nexus approach does not require that countries
implement patent boxes, nor does it require that countries implement patent
boxes that apply the exact equation above, but it does require that, in order to
escape a finding of potential harmfulness, patent boxes cannot provide
benefits to any income that would not qualify under the equation above.73
The OECD has thus described it as a “box around the box” because all patent
boxes that jurisdictions choose to implement must fall within the confines of
the nexus approach. 74
One key element of the nexus approach that is not made explicit in
the 2015 Report is that there are essentially two versions of the nexus
approach: the entity version, which must be implemented by any Member
State of the European Union that has a patent box, and the location version,
which could be implemented by non-EU countries. The 2015 Report presents
the entity version as the only version, since it can be adopted by all
jurisdictions, but several footnotes of the 2015 Report highlight that
jurisdictions outside the EU can choose to design their patent boxes quite
differently. In the entity version, qualifying and overall expenditures are
defined by focusing on which entity undertook them. 75 Qualifying
expenditures are those incurred by the individual entity benefiting from the
patent box and any expenses for outsourcing to unrelated parties, 76 while
overall expenditures include these expenditures plus all acquisition costs and
any expenses for outsourcing to related parties. 77 In other words, the nexus
ratio can be written as

a+b
a+b+c+d
where a includes R&D expenditures incurred by the taxpayer, b includes
expenditures for outsourcing R&D to unrelated parties, c includes
expenditures for acquiring IP from related or unrelated parties, and d includes
72

Feb. 2015 Agreement, supra note 68. See also German press release, supra note 66;
UK press release, supra note 66.
73
Patent boxes may allow income that would not qualify under the nexus approach to
qualify for benefits in limited circumstances if they treat the nexus ratio as a rebuttable
presumption, but the presumption must be designed such that it can only be rebutted in a
narrow set of circumstances. See Action 5 Final Report, supra note 12, at 35-36.
74
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Live Webcast: The
BEPS Package (Oct. 5, 2015), slide 28, available at www.slideshare.net/OECDtax/bepswebcast-8-launch-of-the-2015-final-reports (hereinafter “BEPS Webcast”).
75
Action 5 Final Report, supra note 12, at 27-29.
76
Action 5 Final Report, supra note 12, at 27-28.
77
Action 5 Final Report, supra note 12, at 28-30.
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expenditures for outsourcing R&D to related parties. 78 Qualifying entities
include resident taxpayers as well as both outbound and inbound PEs to the
extent that those PEs are subject to taxation in the jurisdiction providing the
patent box. 79
In the location version, qualifying and overall expenditures are
instead defined by where the expenditures were incurred. Qualifying
expenditures are all R&D expenditures incurred in the jurisdiction providing
benefits, while overall expenditures are all R&D expenditures incurred by the
taxpayer, whether domestically or internationally. 80 Therefore, in the location
version, the nexus ratio can be written as

a
a+b
where a includes all R&D expenditures incurred in the jurisdiction providing
benefits (whether undertaken by the taxpayer itself or outsourced to or
acquired from other parties) and b includes all R&D expenditures incurred
outside the jurisdiction (whether undertaken by the taxpayer itself or
outsourced to or acquired from other parties).
To illustrate the difference between the two versions of the nexus
approach, take A Co., which is resident in Country A, a jurisdiction that has
a patent box. A Co. has three subsidiaries: Sub A, which is also resident in
Country A; Sub B, which is resident in Country B; and Sub C, which is
resident in Country C. This is shown below in Figure 1:

78

Action 5 Final Report, supra note 12, at 28.
This limitation appears to be based on the premise that it would not be beneficial
for a taxpayer that was not otherwise subject to tax at the full corporate rate on its income in
the jurisdiction to subject itself to taxation just for the sake of receiving a reduced rate.
80
The location version is laid out in footnotes 16 and 19 of Chapter 4 of the Action 5
Final Report, supra note 12.
79
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Figure 1

A Co.
Country A

Sub A

Country B

Sub B

Country C
Sub C

A Co. earns royalty income from licensing out Patent A, which it
owns. The initial R&D for Patent A was done by Sub C, which paid 500 to
an unrelated company in Country A to undertake all its R&D. After the rights
to the initial R&D were acquired by A Co. for 500, Patent A was further
developed partly by Sub A and partly by Sub B, each of which was paid 750
for its R&D by A Co. and each of which undertook R&D in its country of
residence. These expenditures are listed below in Table 1:
Table 1
A Co. expenditures:
Acquisition of Sub C R&D
(undertaken in Country A)
Outsourcing
to
Sub
A
(undertaken in Country A)
Outsourcing
to
Sub
B
(undertaken in Country B)
TOTAL

500
750
750

2000

Under both versions, overall expenditures would equal 2000. 81 Under
81

This is because 500 + 750 + 750 = 2000. Note that this example is simplified
because A Co. paid the same amount to Company C that Company C paid for R&D
expenditures. If Company C had paid 400 in R&D expenditures, all of which were for R&D
in Country A, then overall expenditures in the location version would be only 1900. Both
examples assume that Company C was able to show that it had engaged in complete tracking
and tracing to ensure that it did not incur any other expenditures. See footnote 19 of Chapter
4 of the Action 5 Final Report, supra note 12. If Company C was not able to show this, then
overall expenditures would include A Co.’s acquisition costs rather than Company C’s R&D
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the entity version, there would be 0 in qualifying expenditures because all
expenditures for acquisition of the R&D rights from Sub C would be
excluded from qualifying expenditures, as would all expenditures for
outsourcing to both Sub A and Sub B because they are both separate entities
from A Co. Note that this creates an incentive to restructure Sub A so that it
either earns the income its own R&D or so that it merges with A Co.
Under the location version, there would be 1250 in qualifying
expenditures, which would include both the 500 in Country A R&D
expenditures incurred by Sub C and the 750 in Country A R&D expenditures
incurred by Sub A. 82 In both versions, the expenditures incurred for R&D
undertaken by Sub B would be included in overall expenditures and excluded
from qualifying expenditures. In the entity version, this is because Sub B is
an unrelated entity. In the location version, this is because Sub B’s R&D was
undertaken outside of Country A.
These two versions represent two very different visions of substantial
activities. Under the entity version, substantial activities do not include any
R&D outsourced to a related party or any R&D done by another party that
was then acquired. Under the location version, these activities may constitute
substantial activities if they were undertaken within the jurisdiction providing
benefits, regardless of which entity undertook them, while any outsourcing
outside the jurisdiction (whether to a related or unrelated party) does not
constitute substantial activities. In other words, substance as defined in the
entity version depends on who engages in R&D, while substance as defined
in the location version depends on where the R&D takes place. These two
visions of substance may often overlap, but they differ in terms of
fundamental principles.
Although the two versions differ in terms of their overall focus, they
share the same general requirements. Both versions of the nexus approach
share the same definition of IP assets and overall income from IP, and they
also share the same requirements for tracking and tracing of income, as well
as grandfathering. In terms of IP assets, the 2015 Report explicitly states that
only “patents and other IP assets that are functionally equivalent to patents”
can qualify under a nexus-compliant patent box, and any patent box that
provides benefits to other IP assets will therefore be considered potentially
harmful. 83 The 2015 Report defines functionally equivalent IP assets to
include copyrighted software, and it also permits jurisdictions to extend
benefits to a third category of IP assets that are “non-obvious, useful, and
costs in the location version as well as the entity version.
82
This is again only true if Company C engaged in tracking and tracing that could
show that all of its R&D expenditures were for R&D in A Co. See footnote 19 of Chapter 4
of the Action 5 Final Report, supra note 12.
83
Action 5 Final Report, supra note 12, at 26 and footnote 9 of Chapter 4.
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novel” the taxpayers receiving benefits for such assets fall into a narrowly
defined category of small enterprises. 84 Both the 2014 Progress Report and
the 2015 Report make clear that trademarks and marketing-related IP assets
do not fall within the definition of qualifying IP assets. 85 Although this
distinction is not explained in greater detail, this is likely due to the stated
principle of the nexus approach, which is to grant benefits only to taxpayers
that engaged in value-creating R&D activities. If patent boxes were permitted
to grant benefits to all income arising from trademarks or other marketing
related intangibles, these could arguably grant benefits to all income earned
by a company, given that the value of trademarks, brands, know-how, and
other non-qualifying IP assets arises from all the activities of a company. This
in turn would mean that a patent box was essentially just providing a lower
rate for all the income earned by any company with a marketing intangible.
In terms of overall income from IP, the 2015 Report leaves a
significant amount of flexibility to jurisdictions as to how they can define and
calculate qualifying income. Jurisdictions are not required to provide benefits
to embedded IP income, nor are they prohibited from doing so. The 2015
Report instead states that jurisdictions should ensure that they do not provide
benefits to gross income, although it leaves flexibility to them as to how they
define net income, and that they should also ensure that, if they do provide
benefits to embedded income, they do so in a way that ensures that routine
marketing and manufacturing returns do not receive benefits. 86
Because the nexus approach requires a link between expenditures and
income, both versions also require that taxpayers that benefit from a patent
box must engage in sufficient “tracking and tracing” to ensure that the income
receiving benefits did in fact arise from qualifying expenditures. 87 In the 2014
Progress Report, the general description of the nexus approach required that
taxpayers track and trace expenditures and income either to individual IP
assets or to individual products. 88 The 2015 Report acknowledges that such
narrow tracking and tracing may be impossible for large taxpayers with
multiple R&D projects and streams of income, so it also permits tracking and
tracing to product families if taxpayers can show that they could not feasibly
track and trace to a narrower category and they can show that each product
84

Such enterprises can have “no more than EUR 50 million (or a near equivalent
amount in domestic currency) in global group-wide turnover” and may not “themselves earn
more than EUR 7.5 million per year (or a near equivalent amount in domestic currency) in
gross revenues from all IP assets, using a five-year average for both calculations.” Action 5
Final Report, supra note 12, at 26.
85
Action 5 Final Report, supra note 12, at 27; Action 5 Progress Report, supra note
32, at 31.
86
Action 5 Final Report, supra note 12, at 29.
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Action 5 Final Report, supra note 12, at 30-34.
88
Action 5 Progress Report, supra note 32, at 34 and footnote 3 of Chapter 4.
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family includes overlapping streams of expenditures and revenues. 89
Both versions of the nexus approach also permit the grandfathering
of patent boxes that existed prior to a certain date. 90 This is consistent with
previous work of the FHTP, which allowed regimes that would otherwise be
potentially harmful to be grandfathered if “(1) no new entrants are permitted
into the regime, (2) a definite date for complete abolition of the regime has
been announced, and (3) the regime is transparent and has effective exchange
of information.” 91 Patent boxes and other IP regimes may therefore continue
to grant benefits to pre-existing beneficiaries after June 30, 2016, as long as
the jurisdiction with the patent box has begun a legislative process to modify
the box in 2015. 92 Patent boxes may not, however, provide benefits to the
extent that the IP assets benefiting from a grandfathered patent box were
acquired from a related party after January 1, 2016, if they could not have
qualified from a patent box at the time of acquisition. 93 In other words, if a
taxpayer that benefited from an existing patent box on or before June 30,
2016, acquired an IP asset from an unrelated party in any jurisdiction or from
a related party in a jurisdiction with a patent box (including in the same
jurisdiction as the taxpayer), it can qualify for grandfathering, including on
income from that IP asset. If not, it can qualify for grandfathering on all
income other than income from that IP asset. As stated in the February 6,
2015, press release, this grandfathering safeguard was designed to prevent
taxpayers from circumventing grandfathering by transferring IP assets into a
qualifying patent box at the last minute. 94
As of June 30, 2016, therefore, all new patent boxes must comply with
the nexus approach, and no taxpayers can benefit from patent boxes that do
not comply with this approach after June 30, 2021 at the very latest. Patent
boxes that do not comply with the nexus approach by these dates will be
found to be potentially harmful and will then be subject to the FHTP’s
analysis of actual harmfulness.
The overall effect of the nexus approach remains to be seen, but the
fact that there are two different versions of the approach means that this
89

Action 5 Final Report, supra note 12, at 31-32. Both versions of the nexus approach
also permit jurisdictions to establish a transitional measure, although the outlines of such a
transitional measure are again left to jurisdictions to decide. Action 5 Final Report, supra
note 12, at 33. The 2015 Report does provide an example of such a transitional measure, but
it makes clear that this is only provided as an illustration of a possible transitional measure
that a jurisdiction could adopt. Action 5 Final Report, supra note 12, at Annex A.
90
Action 5 Final Report, supra note 12, at 34-35.
91
Action 5 Final Report, supra note 12, at 34 (citing 2004 Progress Report, supra note
59).
92
Action 5 Final Report, supra note 12, at 34.
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Action 5 Final Report, supra note 12, at 35.
94
Feb. 2015 Agreement, supra note 68.
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approach may be less likely to achieve the OECD’s goal of only allowing
reduced rates for income arising from R&D undertaken in the country with
the patent box. Instead, as will be outlined in the next Section, the entity
version of the nexus approach may allow taxpayers and countries to continue
to do at least some R&D in one country and still benefit from a low-rate patent
box in another country.
II. THE LUXEMBOURG EFFECT AND THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL
COOPERATION
As suggested by its name, the entity version of the nexus approach
that appears in the 2015 Report requires patent boxes to divide expenditures
by entity. If the expenditures were incurred by the entity or for outsourcing
to an unrelated party, then they will be qualifying expenditures that increase
the amount of income that qualifies for benefits. If they were expenditures
for acquiring IP from another entity or for outsourcing to a related party, then
they will reduce the amount of income that qualifies for benefits. Taken
together, these requirements mean that the entity version of the nexus
approach is designed to discourage both the shifting of income from entity to
entity and the shifting of innovation from entity to entity. Whereas existing
patent boxes focused more on the shifting of income, the nexus approach now
requires that they also focus on the shifting of innovation and only grant
benefits to income when the innovation itself was undertaken by the entity
receiving benefits.
This in turn suggests one vision of substance that underlies the entity
version of the nexus approach. Because this version maintains a strict focus
on entities rather than on jurisdictions, it suggests that the fundamental issue
underlying patent boxes was not that income was being taxed in one
jurisdiction while the activities were taking place in another jurisdiction.
Instead, the concern about substantial activities was that they were taking
place in one entity (regardless of its location) while the income was being
allocated to another entity (regardless of its location). According to the logic
of the entity version of the nexus approach, this means that a taxpayer that
structures itself such that one domestic subsidiary engages in certain R&D
activities while another domestic subsidiary earns the income from those
activities is engaged in impermissible tax planning.
The location version of the nexus approach, in contrast, focuses on
jurisdictions rather than entities. This version grants benefits only to the
extent that the R&D expenditures were incurred for R&D undertaken in the
jurisdiction granting benefits. If a taxpayer pays for R&D undertaken in
another jurisdiction, those expenditures will reduce the amount of income
that can benefit. This version again discourages both the shifting of income
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and the shifting of innovation, but the focus is not on shifting from entity to
entity but rather from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Under the vision of
substance supported by this version, base erosion and profit shifting takes
place not through shifting between entities but rather through shifting
between jurisdictions. This version is not concerned with whether the R&D
was undertaken by one entity or another, but it is instead concerned with
where the R&D took place, and subjecting the income to tax in one
jurisdiction when the R&D activities took place in another jurisdiction is seen
as impermissible tax planning under this view of substance.
Under the entity version of the nexus approach, the focus on shifting
between entities means that domestic subsidiaries are treated as separate
entities. Therefore, taxpayers with multiple subsidiaries within a Member
State that want to benefit fully from a patent box must restructure to ensure
that the entity that earns income from an IP asset is the same entity that incurs
the R&D expenditures for that IP asset, which may require a different
corporate structure than would otherwise be selected for business reasons.
Moreover, since the entity version does not distinguish between outsourcing
to domestic or foreign entities or between acquiring IP developed through
domestic or foreign R&D, this version of the nexus approach creates a
disincentive against both outsourcing to all related parties and all forms of
acquisition. This could therefore lead companies to view outsourcing and
acquisition as more costly than before, even if these would otherwise be the
most efficient ways to develop an IP asset or increase the amount or quality
of innovation.
A second effect of the entity focus could be to allow some shifting of
income across jurisdictions since branches are not separate taxable entities.
Consider the earlier example illustrated in Figure 1, 95 and imagine that Sub
B is instead Branch B, a branch of A Co. The 750 paid to Branch B and then
used for the R&D done in Country B could now be treated as 750 paid by A
Co. for R&D rather than for related-party outsourcing. It would therefore
become a qualifying expenditure, even though the R&D was undertaken in
Country B, and the nexus ratio as calculated under the entity version of the
approach would now be 37.5% – or 48.75% if Country A applied the 30%
uplift. Therefore, in this example, no income would qualify for the box if Sub
B remained a separate entity, but almost half of IP income could qualify if
Sub B were instead treated as a branch. The entity focus could thus encourage
companies to establish branches instead of subsidiaries, and it could also
permit income to qualify even when the underlying R&D took place
elsewhere
It is unlikely that this would lead to significant income-shifting
95

See supra Section I.B.
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because work in other areas of the BEPS Project should limit the ability of
taxpayers to have such an arrangement respected for tax purposes. Under the
Action 7 output, if Branch B had the significant R&D facilities necessary to
develop Patent A, Branch B would likely be treated as a taxable PE in
Country B. 96 This would therefore mean that Country B would have taxing
jurisdiction over the 750 paid to Sub B, whereas previously this payment
from head office A Co. to Branch B would have been a wash for Country A
tax purposes. This in turn means that it is unlikely that taxpayers will shift a
significant amount of R&D to foreign branches, but the entity version of the
nexus approach does allow for some slippage at the margins, since taxpayers
now have an incentive to shift just enough R&D to a branch so that it will
increase the nexus ratio while not triggering PE status.
Even if neither of these effects ends up being very large, they reveal
that the entity version of the nexus approach will allow some out-of-country
R&D to qualify the resulting IP income for reduced rates under a patent box.
Even if only a small amount of foreign R&D is permitted under the entity
version, this slippage is notable because the OECD’s stated goal with Action
5 was to prevent any income from qualifying for reduced rates, and yet the
entity version undermines this goal and allows the very jurisdictional incomeshifting that the BEPS Project was designed to prevent.
If the nexus approach had only included the location version, several
of the weaknesses identified above would not exist. First, there would be
fewer opportunities for taxpayers to receive benefits for income even when
R&D had not taken place in the jurisdiction providing benefits. Second,
taxpayers would be free to outsource to any parties they saw fit or acquire IP
assets at any stage of their development with no effect on the amount of
income that could benefit, so long as the underlying R&D had itself been
undertaken in the jurisdiction. A third benefit of using only the location
version is that, to the extent that existing research can provide guidance on
the design of patent boxes, the literature suggests that having a jurisdictional
requirement is necessary to increase R&D within the jurisdiction, so the
location version is more consistent with countries’ stated goal of increasing
R&D. 97 Finally, the location version is more consistent with the goals of the
BEPS Project, given that the description of substantial activities in the BEPS
Report focused on shifting income between jurisdictions, not entities. 98
The nexus approach, however, does not only include the location
96

See Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Action 7: 2015
Final Report, Preventing the Artificial Avoidance of Permanent Establishment Status (2015)
(hereinafter “Action 7 Final Report”) (making it more difficult for the branch in the above
example not to be treated as a permanent establishment).
97
See, e.g., Boustany Neal Press Release, supra note 25.
98
See BEPS Report, supra note 46.
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version, and this version is in fact hidden away in the footnotes of the 2015
Report. Why, then, did the OECD agree on a version of the nexus approach
that discourages outsourcing and acquisition, regardless of where the
underlying R&D takes place? Instead of choosing a version that focuses on
jurisdiction, why did the OECD settle on a more complicated and less
intuitive version that focuses on the entity that undertook the R&D rather than
the jurisdiction where the R&D took place?
A. The Impact of European Union Law on Patent Boxes and the Nexus
Approach
The reason that the entity version of the nexus approach exists is EU
law. Countries participating in the BEPS Project believed that the treaty
freedoms of the European Union would not permit the Member States of the
EU to adopt a patent box that focused on jurisdiction. Although direct
taxation is one of the few remaining areas where EU institutions are not able
to act without the unanimous consent of the twenty-eight Member States of
the European Union, Member States are still limited in their ability to design
direct tax provisions by the fundamental freedoms protected by the EU
treaties. 99 Therefore, although the European Union institutions may not have
the ability to pass direct tax legislation without the unanimous support of all
of the EU Member States, the effect of the EU treaties and the ECJ’s
interpretation of the freedoms protected by those treaties has been to limit the
types of direct tax laws that Member States can themselves implement, and
Member States participating in the BEPS Project understood this limitation
to extend to patent boxes.
Article 49 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
(TFEU) prohibits Member States from restricting the freedom of
establishment, 100 while Article 54 TFEU prohibits Member States from
restricting the freedom to provide services. 101 After the ECJ determines in a
case before it that a Member State provision such as an R&D incentive
violates the freedoms enshrined in the TFEU, the Court applies a
proportionality analysis under which a provision that violates one of the
fundamental freedoms could still be found to be consistent with the TFEU if
99

See, e.g., Case C-264/96, Imperial Chem. Indus. PLC (ICI) v. Kenneth Hall
Colmer (HM Inspector of Taxes), 1998 E.C.R. 1-4695 para. 19 (stating that “[a]lthough
direct taxation is a matter for the Member States, they must nevertheless exercise their
direct taxation powers consistently with Community law.”)
100
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Art. 49.
101
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Art. 54. Other articles of the
TFEU protect the free movement of goods, workers, and capital, but the freedom of
establishment and freedom to provide services are the two freedoms that have been
implicated in cases considering R&D incentives.
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it were both justified by one of the justifications that the ECJ has previously
accepted and proportionate to that justification (i.e., tailored sufficiently
narrowly to restrict the freedom only to the extent necessary to achieve the
justification). 102 In direct tax cases, however, the ECJ has only accepted a
few justifications for an otherwise restrictive direct tax provision. These
permitted justifications include ensuring fiscal cohesion, 103 ensuring the
balanced allocation of taxing power, 104 and the prevention of abuse, 105 but
the ECJ has rejected both the prevention of revenue loss and the promotion
of research as permissible justifications for a restriction on the fundamental
freedoms. 106 In previous cases, the European Court of Justice has applied its
fundamental freedom analysis to R&D incentives that only apply to R&D
undertaken in the Member State providing the incentive and concluded that
such incentives are unjustified violations of the freedom of establishment and
the freedom to provide services since they favor taxpayers based on the
location of the R&D. 107
Although some commentators have suggested that the ECJ has been
more accepting of certain discriminatory Member State direct tax provisions
in recent years, 108 the ECJ has not reversed its existing case law regarding
R&D incentives, and the precedents that relate directly to R&D incentives
make clear that an R&D incentive that limits its benefits based on the location
of the R&D would be inconsistent with the freedoms provided in the
TFEU. 109 The EU Member States participating in the BEPS Project thus had
strong legal support to contend that they could not legally implement patent
boxes within the European Union if those patent boxes only provided benefits
based on the location of the R&D. Given that the OECD includes twenty-one
102

See, e.g., Case C-446/03, Marks & Spencer plc v. David Halsey
(HM Inspector of Taxes), 2005 E.C.R. 1-10837, para. 35. For a longer explanation of the
three-part analysis that the ECJ applies to cases considering the fundamental freedoms, see
Lilian V. Faulhaber, Sovereignty, Integration and Tax Avoidance in the European Union:
Striking the Proper Balance, 48 Colum. J. Transnat’l L 190-93 (2010).
103
See, e.g., Case C-204/90, Bachmann v. Belgian State, ECR I-249, para. 28.
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Finances and Ministère de l'Agriculture, de la Pêche et de l'Alimentation, ECR I-04809.
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EU Member States, 110 the parties designing the nexus approach believed that
they could not mandate any differential treatment based on the location of
R&D. Instead, the OECD had to find a different lens through which to view
substantial activities, and the FHTP chose entities. Rather than treating R&D
differently depending on where it took place, the entity version of the nexus
approach therefore treats R&D different depending on who undertook it. This
in turn led to the entity version distinguishing between related and unrelated
parties rather than between domestic and foreign R&D. Outsourcing to all
related parties is excluded from qualifying expenditures, while outsourcing
to all unrelated parties is included in qualifying expenditures. As stated in
both the 2014 Progress Report and the 2015 Report, the reason for this was
that it was assumed that taxpayers would not choose to outsource the actual
value-generating portion of R&D to an unrelated party, so any such
outsourcing would likely be at the margins. 111 In terms of acquisitions, since
there is no way for the EU nexus approach to distinguish between acquisitions
where the underlying R&D took place in the jurisdiction and those that are
just shifting IP out of another jurisdiction, the cost for all acquisitions must
be excluded from qualifying expenditures. The focus on entities is thus
intended to achieve a similar outcome to a focus on the location of the R&D,
but it must allow for some slippage, where some external R&D will be
permitted to increase the nexus ratio and some internal R&D will end up
decreasing the nexus ratio, because EU law currently prohibits any Member
State tax incentive from focusing directly on the location of the R&D. 112
110

The countries that were both Member States of the European Union and OECD
members at the time of the BEPS Project include Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic,
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg,
the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and the
United Kingdom. Norway and Iceland, members of the European Economic Area, and
Switzerland, a member of the European Free Trade Association, are also OECD members
and therefore participated in the BEPS Project.
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Action 5 Final Report, supra note 12, at 29-30. See also Action 5 Progress Report,
supra note 32, at 32-33.
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Since the entity version of the nexus approach was designed to comply with EU law
and adopted by the Code of Conduct Group, see infra notes 126-129 and accompanying text,
this article assumes that, if a nexus-compliant patent box is challenged in front of the ECJ,
the Court will find it not to violate the EU treaty freedoms or the prohibition on state aid.
Given the ECJ’s constantly changing view of the scope of Treaty protections, however, it is
not impossible that, despite the OECD’s efforts to design an approach that is consistent with
EU law, a Member State taxpayer could challenge it as a violation of Treaty freedoms or the
state aid prohibition. If this were to happen, and if the ECJ were to find that a nexuscompliant patent box was inconsistent with the TFEU’s protections, this would strengthen
the arguments in this article about the detrimental effect of EU law on international
cooperation. It would also raise fundamental questions about the interactions between the
institutions of the EU, given the Commission’s participation in the working party meetings
that led to the creation of the nexus approach, the Code of Conduct Group’s adoption of the
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The entity version therefore creates more distortions and more
opportunities for income shifting. Any other version of the nexus approach
that would comply with the EU treaty freedoms as they are currently
understood would, however, not prevent base erosion and profit shifting.
Since the prohibition on discriminating based on the location of R&D means
that a patent box or other back-end tax regime would be consistent with EU
treaty freedoms if it were to provide benefits to all R&D undertaken
throughout the EU, one option for the OECD would have been to design the
nexus approach so that R&D undertaken anywhere in the EU would qualify
the resulting income for benefits. This option, however, would itself create
an incentive for base erosion and profit shifting within the EU, since
taxpayers could benefit from a patent box in a low-tax Member State with
limited support for innovation even if they had undertaken all the R&D in a
different EU Member State that had the infrastructure, educational system,
trained employees, and technical support necessary for that R&D. In other
words, this would permit taxpayers to shift income anywhere within the EU,
even if the underlying activities had taken place in another EU Member State.
The OECD therefore produced the most robust version of the
approach that was possible given the EU law constraints. The fact remains,
however, that it was because of EU law that the nexus approach does not take
the logical approach of focusing on jurisdiction. The logic underlying this
outcome is the logic of the single market: in order to be one supranational
market with no internal barriers, Member States cannot prevent the shifting
of R&D or income within the EU. Yet, given that the EU institutions still
have no affirmative authority over direct taxation, this logic means that the
effect of EU law is in fact to allow and encourage base erosion and profit
shifting.
In many ways, EU law underlies the entire BEPS Project. In the years
leading up to this project, the ECJ struck down or limited a wide range of
Member State anti-avoidance rules. In general, many anti-avoidance rules
treat a payment, transaction, or person differently when there is a crossborder element. Therefore, a domestic taxpayer who engages in purely
domestic transactions will be treated differently for tax purposes than a nonresident taxpayer or a domestic taxpayer who engages in cross-border
transactions. The reason for this is that, when a transaction or event is purely
domestic, the country imposing taxes knows what happens on both ends of
the transaction: if a payment is deducted in the hands of the payor, then it will
be included in the hands of the payee, and the taxing jurisdiction will be
assured that it will be taxed at least once. When a transaction or event is not
purely domestic, however, the opportunities for non-payment of taxes
approach, and the Commission’s decision not to initiate state aid investigations of patent
boxes due to the ongoing debates over the nexus approach.
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increase because one jurisdiction cannot be sure of what is happening in the
other jurisdiction. For example, if the deduction on the payor side was
premised on the assumption that the payment would be taxed on the payee
side, that assumption can no longer be supported if the payee is in another
jurisdiction. It is therefore common to distinguish between domestic and
cross-border transactions in tax legislation. 113
In the European Union, however, the ECJ struck down rules that
treated domestic and cross-border transactions differently. With these
decisions, Member States lost many tools in the fight against tax avoidance.
They could not impose withholding taxes on dividends or similar payments
to other Member States, even if those payments were excluded from income
or otherwise subject to benefits in the recipient Member State. 114 They could
not impose robust controlled foreign company (“CFC”) rules on subsidiaries
in low-tax Member States to prevent income from being shifted into those
subsidiaries. 115 They could not limit the deductibility of interest payments to
other Member States, even if those interest payments were excluded from
income or otherwise subject to benefits in the recipient Member State. 116
They also could not have any anti-avoidance rules that applied to residents of
other Member States unless those rules were sharply curtailed and applied
only to wholly artificial entities or transactions. 117 Essentially, the ECJ barred
Member States from policing tax avoidance within the European Union
because it disallowed rules that discriminated against non-resident taxpayers
and recognized only a very limited exception for the prevention of tax
avoidance. This in turn meant that EU law could at least in part explain many
of the patent boxes that most concerned the jurisdictions that wanted the
BEPS Project to target these provisions. Countries that opposed patent boxes
113

See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. §§ 951-965 (providing rules targeting foreign controlled
corporations that do not apply to domestic controlled corporations).
114
See Case C-170/05, Denkavit Internationaal BV, Denkavit France SARL v.
Ministre de l'Économie, des Finances et de l'Industrie, ECR I-11949 (holding that a tax that
is imposed on dividends paid to non-resident parents and that is not imposed on dividends
paid to resident parents is a violation of the Treaty freedoms).
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See Case C-196/04, Cadbury Schweppes pic, Cadbury Schweppes Overseas Ltd v.
Commissioners of Inland Revenue, ECR I-7995 (holding that controlled foreign company
rules that apply to non-resident subsidiaries and not to resident subsidiaries are a violation
of the Treaty freedoms to the extent that the subsidiaries to which they apply are not wholly
artificial arrangements).
116
Case C-324/00, Lankhorst-Hohorst GmbH v. Finanzamt Steinfurt, ECR-11779
(holding that thin capitalization rules that apply differently to non-resident shareholders and
resident shareholders are a violation of the Treaty freedoms.
117
See Faulhaber, supra note 102, at 177 (defining the “wholly artificial arrangements
doctrine,” according to which the ECJ only permits Member States to justify a discriminatory
measure as a means to prevent tax avoidance if that measure targets only wholly artificial
arrangements).
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were most concerned by those that had no limitation on the location of the
R&D or the identity of the party who undertook the R&D, but EU law was
what prohibited Member States from limiting their patent boxes to income
from domestic R&D.
This meant that, by the time of the BEPS Project, the European Union
had become a safe space for tax avoidance. Taxpayers could structure their
transactions such that they took advantage of the lack of withholding taxes
between jurisdictions and the lack of anti-avoidance rules within EU Member
States. While the jurisprudence of the ECJ was not the only cause of the base
erosion and profit shifting issues facing countries at the time of the BEPS
Project, it was a key factor in creating these issues. This can be seen in the
fact that several of the BEPS Action Items focused on the very areas where
the ECJ had struck down or not permitted Member State rules as violations
of the treaty freedoms. For example, Action 2 focused on hybrid
arrangements, where the same transaction or entity is treated differently in
two different jurisdictions. 118 One way to address these arrangements is for a
jurisdiction to change its treatment based on the other jurisdiction’s
treatment, but this is the type of differential treatment that the ECJ has
previously not permitted. Action 3 focused on CFC rules, which the ECJ had
severely limited. 119 Action 4 focused on interest deductibility rules, which
the ECJ had also limited.120 In effect, these Action Items highlight that one
goal of the BEPS Project was to overcome the limits that had been placed on
anti-avoidance efforts by the ECJ.
And yet, as shown by the nexus approach, efforts to overcome the
ECJ’s jurisprudence were themselves thwarted by the Court’s interpretation
of the freedoms protected in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union. The nexus approach is therefore striking in that it did work within the
confines of EU law to address a problem to which EU law contributed, but it
also highlights that the BEPS Project was hampered from the start given that
many Action Items were limited in what they could achieve based on the legal
constraints that applied to EU Member States. This was true for several other
Action Items as well. The Reports on Action 3 and Action 4, for example,
included several pages that explained the restrictions imposed by the EU
treaty freedoms and made clear that no recommendations in those Reports
should be interpreted as requiring Member States to violate those
freedoms. 121 Given that those freedoms were the very ones that led to weak
118

BEPS Action Plan, supra note 48, at 15.
BEPS Action Plan, supra note 48, at 16.
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BEPS Action Plan, supra note 48, at 16-17.
121
See, e.g., Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Action 3:
2015 Final Report, Designing Effective Controlled Foreign Company Rules 17-18 (2015)
(hereinafter “Action 3 Final Report”) (discussing the constraints placed on CFC rules by EU
119
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CFC and interest deductibility rules in the first place, the fact that the OECD
had to work within those constraints limited the degree to which the OECD
could advocate rules that would eliminate tax avoidance opportunities.
EU law therefore limited the ability of Member States to police tax
avoidance both before and after the BEPS Project. The OECD did propose
recommendations and requirements that went as far as possible at combating
tax avoidance within the constraints of existing EU law, but these constraints
prevented it from adopting the most robust possible anti-avoidance rules.
This effect of EU law is particularly clear within the context of the work on
patent boxes, because this is the one area where the OECD’s outputs include
both the desired outcome and the more limited outcome that is necessary to
comply with EU constraints. By including the location version but explicitly
limiting this version to non-EU countries, the OECD made clear that the
entity version was a deviation from the version that could have been proposed
in the absence of EU law.
Although the ECJ’s interpretations of the treaty freedoms limited the
outcomes under the BEPS Project, this was not the only interaction between
EU institutions and the BEPS Project. Other EU institutions and groupings,
including the Council, the Commission and the Code of Conduct Group, in
fact contributed to strengthening the outputs under the BEPS Project. For
example, in the context of Action 2, which dealt with hybrid mismatch
arrangements, some Member States had interpreted a piece of EU legislation
as preventing the types of rules that were proposed in the Action 2 report. 122
This legislation, known as the Parent-Subsidiary Directive, prevents Member
States from imposing taxes on certain intragroup payments. 123 The Action 2
report, however, included several recommendations, one of which was the
imposition of a tax on intragroup payments. This recommendation said that,
if a subsidiary had been permitted to deduct a payment to a parent, the parent
country could then impose taxes on that payment rather than allowing it to
escape taxation. Some observers saw this and other Action 2
recommendations as violating the Directive. In response to this concern, the
Council of the European Union approved two amendments to the Directive
in 2014 and 2015. The first of these amendments 124 directly supported Action
2 by requiring that a parent impose a tax on a payment to the extent that it
had been deducted in a subsidiary resident in another Member State. The
law).
122
See Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Action 2: 2015
Final Report, Neutralising the Effect of Hybrid Mismatch Arrangements (2015) (hereinafter
“Action 2 Final Report”).
123
Directive 2011/96/EU.
124
Council Directive 2014/86/EU amending Directive 2011/96/EU on the common
system of taxation applicable in the case of parent companies and subsidiaries of different
Member States (8 July 2014).
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second amendment then made it easier for Member States to adopt other
Action 2 recommendations that may also have run afoul of the ParentSubsidiary Directive, thereby eliminating an EU legal constraint that would
have significantly weakened the effectiveness of the BEPS Project’s
recommendations. 125
Another example of cooperation between the European Union and the
OECD can be seen in the Code of Conduct Group’s adoption of the nexus
approach. In 1997, the EU established the Code of Conduct for Business
Taxation, which targeted harmful tax practices within the EU. 126 Since then,
the Code of Conduct Group has been charged with eliminating these
practices, and it does so by applying five criteria when assessing regimes in
Member States: (i) “whether advantages are accorded only to non-residents
or in respect of transactions carried out with non-residents,” (ii) “whether
advantages are ring-fenced from the domestic market,” (iii) “whether
advantages are granted even without any real economic activity and
substantial economic presence within the Member State offering such tax
advantages,” (iv) “whether the rules for profit determination…depart from
internationally accepted principles,” and (v) “whether the tax measures lack
transparency.” 127
More recently, the Code of Conduct Group opened discussions on
Member State patent boxes, many of which were later assessed by the FHTP.
These discussions took place in the context of the Group’s discussions of the
third criterion, which requires that advantages only be granted where there is
real economic activity and a substantial economic presence within the
Member States offering the tax advantage. 128 On November 20, 2014, just
after Germany and the UK released their compromise proposal on the nexus
approach, the Code of Conduct Group announced that it was adopting the
entity version of the nexus approach as developed by the FHTP in the context
of the BEPS Project. 129
125
See Council Press Release, Parent-subsidiary directive: Council agrees to add antiabuse clause against corporate tax avoidance, ST 15103/14 PRESSE (December 9, 2014);
Directive 2015/121/EU (January 27, 2015). This directive added an anti-abuse provision to
the Parent-Subsidiary Directive that would instruct governments not to grant benefits under
the directive to arrangements designed to obtain a tax advantage.
126
Conclusions of the ECOFIN Council Meeting on 1 December 1997 concerning tax
policy (98/C 2/01).
127
Conclusions of the ECOFIN Council Meeting on 1 December 1997 concerning tax
policy (98/C 2/01), Sections B(1)-(5).
128
Conclusions of the ECOFIN Council Meeting on 1 December 1997 concerning tax
policy (98/C 2/01), Sections B(3). On its face, the third factor requires that substantial
activities occur within the jurisdiction granting tax benefits, but the Code of Conduct Group
does not appear to have expressed concerns that this requirement is inconsistent with the
ECJ’s tax avoidance jurisprudence.
129
Van der Meade, supra note 67. In the media, there was some confusion about what
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This adoption increased pressure on Member States who were
participating in the BEPS Project to adopt the nexus approach themselves,
since they would now be subject to it at the EU level regardless of whether
or not the OECD adopted it. Therefore, opposing the nexus approach no
longer provided any benefit to these Member States. This effect can be seen
by the fact that, before the FHTP assessed any patent boxes, the Code of
Conduct Group assessed all Member State patent boxes and concluded that
none of them were compatible with the nexus approach. 130 Furthermore, this
expanded the scope of the nexus approach by subjecting all twenty-eight EU
Member States, including the seven who were not members of the OECD or
G-20, to assessment under the nexus approach. In practical terms, this meant
that Cyprus and Malta patent boxes, both of which applied rates of 2.5% and
neither of which would have been considered under the OECD’s nexus
approach since neither Cyprus nor Malta is an OECD or G-20 member, were
now subject to the nexus approach.
The institutions of the European Union therefore have contributed to
the success of the BEPS Project by reforming EU-level legislation and
adopting the nexus approach in the Code of Conduct Group. The Commission
also took part as an observer in many of the working party and FHTP
meetings that led to the OECD’s recommendations, and it also stepped back
from its 2013 review of patent boxes as state aid. 131 What the two versions of
the nexus approach highlight, however, is that, despite these positive
contributions on the part of other EU institutions, EU law remains a
significant constraint on the ability of Member States to police tax avoidance.
The ECJ’s jurisprudence created opportunities for the base erosion and profit
shifting that led to the BEPS Project, and it also limited the efforts by Member
States and other OECD and G-20 countries to curtail these opportunities
during the BEPS Project. While this is not necessarily the intention of the
Court, which achieves this result merely by interpreting the Treaty freedoms
to prevent discrimination against non-residents, the result of this
interpretation is to create a welcoming environment for tax avoidance within
the European Union.
That effect is worrisome enough when it just constrains the ability of
Member States to police tax avoidance. As will be discussed in the next part
of this Section, however, the BEPS Project expanded the impact of the ECJ’s
organization had developed the nexus approach. See, e.g., Liz Loxton, Closing the loophole:
Tax breaks on IP and patents, Economia (Feb. 5, 2015), available at
http://economia.icaew.com/finance/february-2015/closing-the-double-irish-loophole
(quoting a lawyer as referring to “the EU’s Forum on Harmful Tax Practices,” which does
not exist). This was developed by the FHTP and adopted by the Code of Conduct Group.
130
Van der Meade, supra note 67.
131
See, e.g., Ajay Gupta, Is the EU Preparing for Failure on BEPS?, Tax Notes Int’l
815 (Sept. 7, 2015).
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pro-avoidance jurisprudence so that it is now not only Member States who
are constrained in what they are able to do to prevent tax avoidance. Instead,
the ECJ’s jurisprudence has now made it harder for even non-EU countries
to police tax avoidance and curtail tax competition.
EU Member States were not the only countries that were party to the
BEPS Project. Although they made up twenty-one of the forty-four
participants, the majority of the countries taxing part in the BEPS Project
were not EU Member States. But, as shown above, the results of the BEPS
Project were constrained by legal requirements that applied only to those
twenty-one Member States. This in turn illustrates an important new
development in international relations: it is no longer just the Member States
of the European Union who are subject to EU law constraints. These
constraints now effect countries outside the European Union as well.
B. The Luxembourg Effect
Although the two different versions of the nexus approach mean that
EU Member States are the only countries that must implement the entity
version, they do not mean that other countries cannot implement the entity
version. Instead, non-EU countries are free to adopt either the entity version
or the location version (or a mix of the two). And even though the location
version is more consistent with the goals of Action 5, it is likely that many
jurisdictions even outside the European Union will end up implementing at
least a version of the entity version of the nexus approach. One of the main
reasons for implementing a patent box is to compete with other countries for
both revenue and R&D activity. Therefore, when countries have a choice
between a tax incentive that will be more attractive to taxpayers or one that
will be less attractive because it provides fewer benefits, many countries will
choose the former. The entity version of the nexus approach allows for patent
boxes that are generally more attractive to taxpayers because they are likely
to allow some extraterritorial R&D to qualify for benefits, while the location
version does not. 132 That said, the entity version also creates more complexity
by requiring greater tracking and tracing and creating pressures against
outsourcing and acquisition, so some non-EU countries may adopt the entity
version, while others may incorporate some combination of the entity version
and the location version, such as a patent box that focuses on which entity
undertook the R&D but then adopts jurisdiction-focused rules on
acquisitions.
132

This is because of the treatment of unrelated party outsourcing. The treatment of
acquisitions, however, is less generous under the entity version, so this may overall end up
being less generous. Jurisdictions could, however, choose to adopt the entity version as it
applies to outsourcing and the location version as it applies to acquisition.
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Even if some non-EU countries adopt a purely jurisdiction-focused
patent box, however, the mere existence of the entity version of the nexus
approach changes the competitive environment in which countries are
deciding to adopt patent boxes. The fact that the EU Member States were able
to shape the nexus approach so that it focused on entities rather than location
means that taxpayers now know that, at least in the European Union, patent
boxes will allow for some degree of income-shifting, where non-local R&D
can qualify income for benefits. This in turn means that non-EU jurisdictions
that see themselves competing with EU jurisdictions for taxpayers and
income will feel pressure to allow similar slippage in their own patent boxes.
EU law, therefore, no longer has an effect just on the Member States
of the European Union. Instead, when combined with the competitive
pressures facing countries as they design tax incentives, it changes the legal
landscape for other countries. In other words, when EU Member States are
part of an international or transnational negotiation, EU law shapes those
negotiations and can have an effect on the law that applies in non-EU
countries as well as in Member States. This lesson can be seen in some of the
other outputs from the BEPS Project as well. In the context of CFC rules, for
example, the apparent goal of including Action 3 was to push for more robust
CFC rules worldwide. 133 The outcome from Action 3, however, only set out
non-binding recommendations for countries that wished to adopt CFC rules,
and it expressly acknowledged that these rules could not be designed in a way
that was inconsistent with the EU treaty freedoms. 134 Given that EU treaty
freedoms were what had weakened Member State CFC rules to begin with,
this acknowledgment did not offer much comfort to observers who had hoped
that the BEPS Project would lead to stronger rules than those permitted under
the ECJ’s jurisprudence. 135
EU law therefore has a much broader reach than has previously been
acknowledged. Although many academics have discussed the internal
133

BEPS Action Plan, supra note 48, at 16 (outlining the positive effects of CFC rules).
Action 3 Final Report, supra note 121, at 17 (stating that “EU Member States will
need to ensure that they make choices that are consistent with EU law”).
135
The Action 3 Final Report did suggest that Member States could design their CFC
rules to be more robust than what they currently had. This recommendation suggested that,
while most Member State CFC rules were designed to target only wholly artificial
arrangements, they could also be designed to target a wider variety of subsidiaries as long as
that included both resident and non-resident subsidiaries, or they could be designed to target
“partly wholly artificial arrangements,” or they could be designed to apply more broadly so
long as they could be justified by a need to maintain the balanced allocation of taxing power.
See Action 3 Final Report, supra note 121, at 17-18. All these suggestions were placed within
the constraint of EU law, however, and the fact that the Action 3 Final Report did not require
any Member States to implement CFC rules means that these design options will not change
the environment for CFC rules unless Member States affirmatively want to test the limits of
EU law.
134
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inconsistencies of the ECJ’s direct tax jurisprudence 136 and the effect of this
case law on Member State tax provisions, 137 the nexus approach shows that
the ECJ’s direct tax jurisprudence has an effect on tax provisions outside of
the European Union. This means that the European Union and its court
system are not only important for EU legal experts, but instead for all
countries that are negotiating with the EU or competing with the EU for
taxpayers, income, or anything else.
In an earlier article, 138 Anu Bradford identified what she referred to
as the “Brussels effect,” whereby the European Union has raised the floor for
regulatory standards through market harmonization. 139 In the process
identified by Bradford, standards in areas where the EU has regulatory
authority (such as antitrust law, privacy, human health, and the
environment) 140 have been heightened even outside the EU because the EU’s
higher regulatory standards have pushed up all regulatory standards due to
market pressures. 141
This article introduces the Luxembourg effect (so named because the
primary seat of the European Court of Justice is Luxembourg). 142 In an area
such as direct taxation, where the EU institutions do not have any regulatory
authority but the ECJ does have jurisdiction, 143 the EU cannot raise
international standards through market convergence, so the Brussels effect
does not apply. What the nexus approach shows us, however, is that the
opposite outcome arises. Instead of just leaving individual country standards
as is, the ECJ reduces these standards when it finds that individual Member
State provisions are inconsistent with the Treaty freedoms. These reduced
standards are then exported through international competition. The reduced
ability of Member States to police tax avoidance therefore does not just affect
Member States, but it changes the entire competitive landscape and creates
pressures for other countries to also reduce their anti-avoidance standards.
Therefore, while the Brussels effect leads to upward pressure on regulatory
standards, the Luxembourg effect leads to downward pressure on
international standards. 144
136

See, e.g., Mason & Knoll, supra note 5; Graetz & Warren, supra note 5.
See, e.g. Faulhaber, supra note 102.
138
Anu Bradford, The Brussels Effect, 107 Northwestern U. L. Rev. 1 (2012).
139
Bradford, supra note 138, at 3.
140
Bradford, supra note 138, at 19.
141
Bradford, supra note 138, at 3.
142
While the Commission and other EU institutions are located in Brussels, the
primary seat of the European Court of Justice is Luxembourg.
143
Professor Bradford acknowledged that the Brussels effect does not apply in areas
where the “missing regulatory propensity…reflects a preference for heterogeneity in the EU”
and identified direct taxation as one such area. Bradford, supra note 138, at 59.
144
This article views greater opportunities for tax avoidance as examples of reduced
137
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This effect was made particularly clear in the context of the BEPS
Project, since the goal of that project was to raise international standards
limiting tax avoidance. In many of the Action Items, the OECD and G-20
achieved this goal: they introduced rules to combat hybrid mismatch
arrangements, which very few countries had even attempted to prevent;145
they made it harder to avoid PE status; 146 they established new requirements
for exchanging and collecting taxpayer information; 147 and they modified
transfer pricing guidance to allocate more income to jurisdictions where value
creation took place. 148 These outcomes could be achieved either because the
ECJ had not yet decided cases in that specific area or because the area
appeared to fall outside the ECJ’s existing jurisprudence. In the context of
hybrid mismatch arrangements, for example, the Council’s amendment to the
Parent-Subsidiary Directive was sufficient to remove at least some limits on
Member State action. PE status was a change made to bilateral treaties, and,
although the ECJ has previously challenged treaty provisions, the
establishment of PE status is further from the ECJ’s jurisprudence than an
individual domestic law affecting cross-border taxation. Exchange of
information was outside the scope of the ECJ’s jurisprudence because this
information was required of all taxpayers, and the transfer pricing changes
were just made in the guidance, which the ECJ sees as generally consistent
with EU law.
But in areas where the ECJ had already ruled on the inconsistency of
Member State rules with EU law, the OECD members were not able to agree
to raise international standards as high as they could have in the absence of
EU law. EU law therefore has an effect that goes beyond the borders of the
EU – and Bradford’s arguments about regulatory convergence go beyond the
borders of the EU’s regulatory authority. Regulatory convergence in fact
happens in reverse in direct taxation because this is an area where the EU has
no regulatory authority, the ECJ has struck down the ability of Member States
to pass legislation, and countries gain a competitive advantage by lowering
standards and downward pressure. Although advocates for patent boxes may disagree with
this characterization, the fact that the Luxembourg effect meant that the OECD and the FHTP
agreed to an approach that allowed more jurisdictional income-shifting than otherwise would
have been consistent with the stated goals of Action 5 supports the view of this effect as
leading to reduced standards and downward pressure.
145
Action 2 Final Report, supra note 122.
146
Action 7 Final Report, supra note 96.
147
Action 5 Final Report, supra note 12, at 45-60 (setting out rules for the spontaneous
exchange of rulings); Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Action 13:
2015 Final Report, Transfer Pricing Documentation and Country-by-Country Reporting
(2015).
148
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Actions 8-10: 2015
Final Reports, Aligning Transfer Pricing Outcomes with Value Creation (2015).
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their own standards. Member States therefore face a legislative and
regulatory vacuum, where they cannot implement their chosen provisions but
no EU institution has the authority to replace those provisions with EU-wide
harmonization. This vacuum in turn affects countries outside the EU because
the reduced standards in the European Union create a lower bar against which
to compete and thus reduce international standards.
As the nexus approach illustrates, there are three requirements for the
Luxembourg effect to apply. First, the EU institutions cannot have separate
regulatory competence in the area. In other words, the area must be one where
the unanimous consent of the Member States of the European Union is
required for any legislation. This requirement is met in the direct tax area, as
well as several other areas, including the EU’s common foreign and security
policy (CFSP), family law, social security and social protection, and the
granting of rights to EU citizens. 149 Second, the European Court of Justice
must have jurisdiction over cases in this area. Although this second
requirements is also met in the direct tax area, it is not met in all areas that
require unanimous consent. The ECJ does not, for example, have jurisdiction
over cases involving the CFSP.150 Finally, the area must be one in which
countries gain a competitive advantage by reducing standards. This third
requirement is met in the direct tax area, since countries believe that they
benefit from making it easier to engage in income shifting transactions. This
may not, however, be true in many of the other areas that meet the first two
requirements. In the area of family law, for example, the regulatory vacuum
also exists because Member States have retained the unanimity requirement
over legislation in this area 151 but the ECJ has struck down Member State
laws in this area. 152 The effect of the ECJ’s jurisprudence has again been to
149

See, e.g., Treaty on European Union, Art. 42(4) (common foreign and security
policy); Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Art. 21(3) (social security); Treaty
on the Functioning of the European Union, Art. 25 (rights for EU citizens); Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union, Art. 81(3) (family law).
150
Treaty on European Union, Art. 24(1) (noting that, although the ECJ does not have
jurisdiction over cases involving CFSP, it does have jurisdiction “to monitor compliance
with Article 25b of this Treaty and to review the legality of certain decisions as provided for
by the second paragraph of Article 240a of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union”).
151
Note that the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union does provide for the
possibility of Member States agreeing to allow some family law legislation to be approved
by qualified majority voting, but any such agreement requires the unanimous consent of all
Member States. Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Art. 81(3).
152
See, e.g., Kunqian Catherine Zhu and Man Lavette Chen v Secretary of State for
the Home Department, Case C-200/02 (Oct. 19, 2004) (interpreting the right of residence to
mean that petitioners had the right to reside in one Member State that did not recognize
birthright citizenship when their only claim to this right was birthright citizenship granted in
another Member State).
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lower regulatory standards in this area, but non-EU countries may not have
had their own family law legislation affected by reduced standards within the
European Union because competition in this area does not focus on reduced
standards. This third requirement means that the Luxembourg effect is
limited to the few areas such as direct taxation where lower standards are
beneficial to countries from a competitive perspective. Although that means
that the Luxembourg effect may not be as common as the Brussels effect, the
Luxembourg effect is still significant in that it illustrates the long reach of EU
law in the direct tax area and the impact that the ECJ’s decisions can have
beyond the borders of the European Union.
The third requirement also highlights the political story underlying
the development of the two versions of the nexus approach – and it highlights
a cost of the UK’s recent “Brexit” vote that has not previously been
discussed. 153 The third requirement of the Luxembourg effect states that
countries must receive a competitive advantage from a reduction in standards.
This implies that many of the countries debating the nexus approach were
aware that a version of the approach that allowed for some out-of-jurisdiction
R&D to qualify for reduced rates would allow countries that adopted a patent
box that complied with such a version to continue to attract income from other
jurisdictions. The limits imposed by EU law therefore provided a convenient
excuse for those countries that already had existing patent boxes and that
wanted to ensure that these regimes could continue to allow some degree of
jurisdictional income shifting. While the 30% uplift that was agreed to by the
UK (a country with a patent box that had previously allowed for jurisdictional
income shifting) 154 and Germany (a country that publicly stated that it wanted
to eliminate all patent boxes) 155 already achieved this goal and allowed
countries to receive benefits for at least some of their out-of-jurisdiction
R&D, the entity version also contributed to the lowering of anti-avoidance
standards. The Luxembourg effect illustrates that, despite public complaints
by EU Member State politicians about the many limitations imposed on them
by EU law, these supposed limitations may in fact be more of a shield that
protects Member States’ more pro-avoidance direct tax rules from challenge
and in turn sets the bar progressively lower for anti-avoidance rules
worldwide.
This political story also adds another dimension to the effects of the
recent UK referendum in favor of leaving the European Union. Although
politicians throughout the United Kingdom were outspoken about the ways
in which the European Union limited their freedom in designing domestic
153

“Brexit” is the term for the outcome of the UK referendum on June 23, 2016, where
the majority of voters elected to leave the European Union.
154
See Feb. 2015 Agreement, supra note 68.
155
See Houlder & Peel, supra note 20.

29-June-16]

Patent Boxes and International Cooperation

43

law, 156 the Luxembourg effect highlights that, at least in the direct tax area,
the United Kingdom may have benefited from the political cover provided by
the limits imposed by EU law. This is particularly evident in the context of
patent boxes. Prior to the BEPS Project, politicians from other countries
directly criticized the UK patent box as an example of unfair tax
competition. 157 The BEPS Project did not, however, eliminate the UK’s
patent box. It instead allowed the United Kingdom to keep a patent box so
long as it was consistent with the entity version of the nexus approach. 158 The
United Kingdom and other EU Member States with patent boxes were
therefore able to use EU law as a shield to protect a rule that otherwise may
have been eliminated. If the United Kingdom is no longer a Member State of
the European Union, however, it will be in the same position as all the other
non-EU countries that are subject to the Luxembourg effect. In other words,
even though a majority of its electorate voted to no longer be subject to the
laws of the European Union, the United Kingdom will still be faced with a
competitive landscape shaped by this very law, but it will no longer be able
to use this law as a political shield to protect its own domestic interests.
This means that, while the debates over the internal consistency of the
ECJ’s direct tax jurisprudence are important and relevant, they are not the
only debates that should be taking place around this case law. Instead, there
needs to also be a focus on how this jurisprudence affects countries beyond
the EU as well as Member States and a discussion of what can be done. The
following Section considers some possible answers, but, as shown by the
nexus approach and other outcomes of the BEPS Project, most of these
answers require the ECJ and the other EU institutions to limit these
constraints, which they have thus far been unwilling to do.
III. POSSIBLE RESPONSES TO THE LUXEMBOURG EFFECT
As outlined above, the long reach of the ECJ’s direct tax
jurisprudence exists because of the combination of (i) the EU institutions’
lack of authority to pass direct tax legislation without the unanimous support
of Member States, (ii) the ECJ’s jurisdiction over cases arising under the
freedoms protected by the TFEU, and (iii) the competitive advantage of
having lower standards. This Section briefly considers responses to the
156

See, e.g., David Cameron, The EU is Not Working and We Will Change It, The
Telegraph (Mar. 15, 2014) (sharing concerns that “the degree of European interference in
our everyday life [is] excessive”).
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See, e.g., Houlder & Peel, supra note 20.
158
The UK and all other jurisdictions with existing patent boxes were also permitted
to continue to provide benefits until 2021 to taxpayers that had previously benefited from the
existing patent box. See Action 5 Final Report, supra note 12, at 34-35.
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Luxembourg effect that would address each of these requirements, although
it acknowledges that many of these responses are unlikely to succeed in the
short term, so the first step toward addressing the Luxembourg effect must be
raising awareness of its existence.
A. Responses to the EU Institutions’ Lack of Regulatory Authority
One way to address the Luxembourg effect in the field of direct
taxation would be to grant the EU institutions the competence to pass EUlevel directives or regulations in this area without the unanimous consent of
the Member States. In other words, direct tax could become one of the many
areas where only qualified majority voting is required for EU-level
legislation. 159 Moving direct taxation to QMV was considered during the
debates over the EU Constitution in 2003 and 2004, 160 but this proposal was
not incorporated into the final version, 161 so it is unlikely that such a reform
will be achieved in the short term. Moreover, even if the EU institutions had
the authority to pass direct tax legislation, this legislation would still need to
conform to the ECJ’s interpretations of the treaty freedoms, so this would still
not remove the downward pressure on direct tax standards. This can be
illustrated by the recent work done by the Commission and Council on a
proposed Anti-Tax Avoidance (ATA) Directive. 162 Although this Directive
at first appears to be a move away from the reduced standards that led to the
Luxembourg effect, it in fact illustrates just how difficult it will be for
Member States to offset the Luxembourg effect through political agreement
since it is still subject to the Treaty freedoms as interpreted by the ECJ.
Therefore, even though it includes proposals for an interest deductibility rule,
159

See Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Art. 238(3)(a) (setting out
the requirements for qualified majority voting.
160
See European Commission, Opinion of the Commission, pursuant to Article 48 of
the Treaty on European Union, on the Conference of representatives of the Member States’
governments convened to revise the Treaties (Sept. 17, 2003), pg. 7 (proposing that the
Constitution allow for QMV in areas such as “taxation in connection with the operation of
the internal market, i.e. modernising and simplifying existing legislation, administrative
cooperation, combating fraud or tax evasion, measures relating to tax bases for companies,
but not including tax rates; the aspects of free circulation of capital linked to the fight against
fraud; taxation in respect of the environment; certain aspects of social security; certain
measures concerning passports; and the European public prosecutor's role in safeguarding
the Union's financial interests”).
161
See Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe (Oct. 29, 2004). Note that this
treaty was not ratified after voters in France and the Netherlands voted against it in 2005.
162
Council of the European Union, Memo to Delegates on the Outcome of
Proceedings: Proposal for a Council Directive laying down rules against tax avoidance
practices that directly affect the functioning of the internal market − Outcome of ECOFIN
meeting, 13-30 (June 17, 2016) (hereinafter “Proposed ATA Directive”).
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an exit tax, a general anti-abuse rule, a CFC rule, and a hybrid mismatch
rule, 163 many of these rules are still constrained by the ECJ’s jurisprudence.
Consistent with Lankhorst-Hohorst, 164 for example, the proposed interest
deductibility rule is not a thin capitalization rule that focuses only on interest
paid to foreign parents but is instead a jurisdiction-neutral rule that applies
based on a proportionate calculation. 165 Consistent with National Grid
Industries, 166 the proposed exit tax is not an immediate penalty but instead a
tax that may be extended over five years for transfers within the EEA.167
Moreover, both the general anti-abuse rule and the CFC rule adopt the
terminology of Cadbury Schweppes 168 and apply only to “non-genuine
arrangements.” 169 Therefore, although the proposed ATA Directive may lead
more Member States to have anti-avoidance rules, many of these rules will
not go any further toward preventing tax avoidance than the rules that already
exist in Member States since even EU-level legislation is restricted by the
pro-avoidance jurisprudence of the ECJ.
B. Responses to the ECJ’s Jurisdiction over Direct Tax Cases
EU-wide legislation thus does not seem to be the answer to the current
stalemate since even that would be subject to the Treaty freedoms. What,
then, could be done at the ECJ level to address this situation? One option
would be for Member States to amend the treaties to restrict the ECJ’s
jurisdiction over direct tax cases. Member States have, however, previously
considered and rejected the idea of rescinding the ECJ’s jurisdiction over
direct tax cases, 170 so this is again unlikely to be an option in the short term.
A second option would be for the Court itself to change its approach
163

Proposed ATA Directive, supra note 162, at 18-29.
Case C-324/00, supra note 116.
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Proposed ATA Directive, supra note 162, at 18-21.
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C-371/10, National Grid Indus. BV v. Inspecteur van de Belastingdienst
Rijnmond/kantoor Rotterdam, ECR I-12273.
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Proposed ATA Directive, supra note 162, at 21-24
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Case C-196/04, supra note 115.
169
Proposed ATA Directive, supra note 162, at 25-28. This is a blanket limitation for
the general anti-avoidance rule. The CFC rule allows Member States either to apply a blanket
rule that applies to all non-genuine arrangements or to apply their rules only to CFCs that do
not “carr[y] on a substantive economic activity supported by staff, equipment, assets and
premises, as evidenced by relevant facts and circumstances.” For Member States that choose
the latter path, they can apply their CFC rules more broadly to subsidiaries in non-EEA
countries. Both of these were designed to be consistent with Cadbury Schweppes, which
focused on the treatment of subsidiaries within the European Union (and, by extension, the
EEA).
170
See Ruth Mason, Made in America for European Tax: The Internal Consistency
Test, 49 B.C. L. REV. 1277, 1280 (2008).
164

46

The Luxembourg Effect

[29-June-16

to deciding direct tax cases. It could, for example, adopt a more deferential
approach when deciding cases involving Member State implementation of
internationally agreed recommendations. Although the ECJ is not a political
body, many commentators have noted throughout the years that its deference
to Member State rules and its interpretation of the Treaty freedoms fluctuate
in line with the political pressures facing the European Union. 171 Given that
the Commission participated in OECD meetings about the BEPS outputs and
that twenty-one Member States of the EU participated in the BEPS Project,
the ECJ could interpret the BEPS outputs as the result of international
cooperation to which it should defer, and it could therefore see any
restrictions arising from these as outside the scope of the Treaty freedoms. 172
This could provide Member States and non-EU countries with more certainty
that, if they were to agree to heightened standards in any future international
agreements, those standards would be more protected than individual
Member State rules. 173 This would, however, contrast with the ECJ’s selfpresentation as an apolitical body that is merely interpreting the Treaty
freedoms, so it may be unlikely in the short term that the Court would follow
this approach.
Alternatively, the Court could also change its approach to deciding
direct tax cases by accepting more justifications for provisions that are
designed to prevent tax avoidance. As discussed above, the ECJ now accepts
only a narrow group of justifications for direct tax provisions that
discriminate based on jurisdiction, and it has rejected the need to raise
revenue as an acceptable justification. 174 In order to make it easier for
Member States to prevent income shifting, it could accept other justifications,
such as the need to prevent shifting of income across jurisdictions or the need
to prevent double non-taxation. Such a development would, however, break
from the Court’s previous case law, and it would also be inconsistent with the
overall vision of the European Union as a single market since it would allow
more Member State measures to discriminate based on jurisdiction.
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C. Responses to Competitive Pressures for Lower Standards
In the near term, therefore, the situation is likely to remain as it
currently is: Member States cannot pass anti-avoidance legislation that
discriminates based on jurisdiction, and the EU institutions cannot pass antiavoidance legislation at the EU level without unanimous Member State
consent. This in turn means that, at least in areas where the ECJ has struck
down Member State rules, international tax standards are themselves going
to be pushed down by the effect that EU law has on the competitive
landscape. The Member States’ unwillingness to address this impasse could
therefore continue to have effects on countries outside the European Union.
In the longer term, however, as non-EU countries become more aware
of the Luxembourg effect (or, after the Brexit vote, as countries that were
previously Member States become non-EU countries that are now subject to
the Luxembourg effect and no longer have the ability to effectuate any of the
above reforms), Member States may come under pressure from non-EU
countries to either rescind the ECJ’s jurisdiction over direct tax cases or to
eliminate the unanimity requirement for direct tax legislation. 175 Since the
effect of the ECJ’s decisions has now been exported outside of the European
Union, some of the non-EU countries most affected by the reduced
international standards may start to apply pressure to the Member States to
fix this situation. Therefore, although Member States previously rejected
either of these solutions, the long reach of EU law may mean that the parties
demanding change are no longer just the Member States. Instead, as
illustrated by the nexus approach, the parties demanding change could end
up expanding to include all those countries subject to the downward pressure
of the ECJ’s decisions. This result would mean that, by exporting the effect
of its decisions, the ECJ could also end up importing the political pressure
necessary to solve the current impasse.
CONCLUSION
At the start of the BEPS Project, several countries and commentators
expressed concern about the effect of patent boxes on the international tax
environment. They claimed that patent boxes were leading to reduced tax
rates and greater opportunities for base erosion and profit shifting. 176 In
response, the OECD and G-20 designed the nexus approach to require these
175
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tax provisions to require substantial activities. While the nexus approach did
impose limitations on patent boxes and may even lead to a reduction in the
number of patent boxes in the long-term, it also included two separate
versions: the main version, which focused on entities, and a version hidden
in the footnotes, which focused on the location of the underlying R&D. As
suggested by the BEPS Report that the OECD issued in 2013, as well as
empirical literature on the effectiveness of patent boxes, a limitation based
on the location of the underlying R&D would have been the most logical way
to curtail patent boxes and ensure that they achieved their stated goal of
increasing the amount of R&D in a jurisdiction. And yet the entity version of
the nexus approach focuses on entities, which creates incentives to restructure
and disincentives for outsourcing and acquisition, as well as more
opportunities for income shifting than a location-based approach.
One reason for this deviation away from the more logical approach
was EU law. Even though EU law created many of the base erosion and profit
shifting opportunities that led to calls for the BEPS Project, the involvement
of Member States of the European Union in the Project meant that the outputs
of the project were themselves limited by EU law. The pro-avoidance
jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice thus did not just have an
impact on Member States of the EU. Instead, it had an impact on other
countries as well, since these countries were now competing for revenue and
taxpayers in an environment where patent boxes could be designed to comply
with the more lenient entity version of the nexus approach.
The nexus approach therefore illustrates the long reach of EU law. No
longer do decisions of the ECJ just reduce the ability of Member States to
pass direct tax legislation. They now also push down international standards
on taxation through the Luxembourg effect: where the lack of EU-wide
regulatory authority and the ECJ’s jurisprudence combine to create a vacuum,
that vacuum will lead to lower standards internationally when other countries
are competing with the Member States of the European Union. In the context
of tax avoidance, this means that it is now harder for all countries – including
those not subject to the EU treaties – to police tax avoidance because the ECJ
has interpreted anti-avoidance rules to violate the Treaty freedoms.
Although the ECJ and Member States could theoretically address this
problem by agreeing to EU-wide tax legislation and reducing the ECJ’s
jurisdiction over direct tax cases, these options seem unlikely, at least in the
near future. The lesson to be learned from the nexus approach is therefore
that academics, practicing lawyers, and negotiators alike must all be aware of
the effect that the ECJ’s jurisprudence has on regulatory convergence in the
direct tax area. While discussions of the impact of this jurisprudence within
the EU are important and relevant, the conversation also needs to focus on
the impact of this jurisprudence outside the EU as well and acknowledge that
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the European Court of Justice is making decisions that limit the ability of the
United States and other non-EU countries to police and prevent international
tax avoidance.

